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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: FISCAL ILLUSION IN PUBLIC FINANCE: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Frances Louise Lightsey Marshall, Doctor of Philosophy, 1989 
Dissertation directed by: Professor Wallace E. Oates 
Department of Economics 
This study of fiscal illusion begins by surveying 
existing studies of its nature and consequences: finding no 
consensus upon its definition proposes a comprehensive one: 
"the misperception by one or more individuals of the value 
of one or more fiscal parameters." No specifications of 
source, locus, nature, duration, variables affected, or 
direction of bias are presumed, and none are precluded. The 
issue of aggregation of individual perceptions, often 
preempted as definitional, is found to be crucial in 
interpreting the existing literature. 
The theoretical portion of the study uses the standard 
consumer choice model and the median voter model, again 
finding that the method of aggregating individual choices is 
crucial. It demonstrates that high average and total levels 
of fiscal illusion can be consistent with efficient social 
outcomes and that survey evidence is inappropriate for 
assessing the importance of fiscal illusion. It further 
finds that the impact of fiscal illusion on individual 
welfare provides a source of potential gain for agents who 
can dispel that illusion in individuals who may be decisive 
for the outcome of the collective choice process. 
An examination of the incentives of various agents to 
dispel illusion concludes that, though the existing 
literature evinces a recurrent concern that fiscal illusion 
results in misallocation of resources to and within the 
public sector, especially through the public officials' 
manipulation of citizens' perceptions, there exists a 
considerable array of forces that have significant power to 
limit the ability of such illusion to impose important 
burdens upon the electorate. 
The work concludes with an empirical study of the 
fiscal illusion hypothesis, in which estimates of the dollar 
magnitudes of the state tax "windfalls" resulting from the 
federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 are calculated and, in the 
estimated model, are found to exert no significant impact 
upon either the levels of state expenditures or changes in 
those levels. Because the windfalls are exogenous, this 
finding is free from the simultaneity issues that have 
compromised existing empirical studies of fiscal illusion. 
The results are consistent with the proposition that 
existing forces effectively limit the sway of fiscal 
illusion. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY 
I. Fiscal Illusion in Broad Perspective 
Over time a substantial literature on the subject of 
fiscal illusion has developed, describing, measuring, and 
analyzing various aspects of fiscal illusion, and often 
addressing the concern that widespread voter misperception 
of fiscal parameters distorts fiscal choices and is subject 
to manipulation by public officials to further their own 
self-interest at the expense of the public interest. 
In the earlier writings in this country, authors such 
as Downs and Galbraith were concerned that imperfect 
information would result in suboptimal levels of public 
provision of goods and services, with benefits subject to a 
greater degree of underperception than costs. 1 In contrast, 
the early writings of Puviani and the more recent work of 
the public choice school have emphasized hidden burdens of 
taxes and overestimation of benefits, resulting in 
supraoptimal levels of public provision of goods and 
1Downs and Galbraith tend to convey a sense of 
impotence in the face of the disparity of knowledge. 
Interestingly, they themselves (especially Galbraith) act as 
agents who inform the public of their. illusions; they do 
not, however, attribute particular significance to the 
considerable number of other agents who play this same role. 
1 
services and unduly large budgets. As yet, the direction 
and even the existence of such bias in the size of the 
public sector remain unresolved questions. 
II. Manifestations of Fiscal Illusion 
2 
Sharing the common element of a misperception of fiscal 
variables, five manifestations of fiscal illusion have 
received particular attention in the literature. 2 An 
awareness of these concrete examples provides a helpful 
foundation for the more abstract treatment in the rest of 
this work that encompasses all manifestations of fiscal 
illusion. 
Since Puviani's recognition, early in this century, 
"that the total tax load on an individual can be fragmented 
so that he confronts numerous small levies rather than a few 
significant ones," making the individual less conscious of 
the sacrifice that he undergoes in support of government 
services, 3 Buchanan (1960, 1967), Wagner (1976), and many 
others have addressed the issue of revenue complexity, in 
which the illusion takes the form of voters underperceiving 
the tax burden when a complex variety of tax instruments is 
employed to fragment the total tax burden. In consequence, 
a higher degree of complexity of the revenue system is 
2oates (198Bb) surveys and assesses this literature. 
3Puviani's analysis is described in Buchanan (1960, 
135). 
associated with a larger public budget. Studies by Munley 
and Greene (1978), Clotfelter (1976), Pommerehne and 
Schneider (1978), Baker (1983), and Breeden and Hunter 
(l985) have explored this form of illusion in a variety of 
settings. 
3 
In renter illusion, the common empirical finding that 
local jurisdictions with higher proportions of renters have 
higher levels of per capita expenditures on local public 
goods is interpreted as evidence of a form of fiscal 
illusion in which renters, because they do not accurately 
perceive the property tax component of their rental 
payments, believe that the tax price they pay for local 
public services is lower than it actually is. The 
consequence of this posited illusion is that they vote for 
higher levels of public provision of goods and services, 
which is.reflected in higher levels of public expenditure. 
studies by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Peterson (1975), 
Martinez-Vasquez (1983) and others have addressed this form. 
of fiscal illusion. 
A third form treats an income elastic tax structure as 
a source of fiscal illusion. In this case individuals fail 
to perceive the full burden of the "automatic" increases in 
taxes as incomes rise, allowing expenditures to rise beyond 
the level voters would prefer if they perceived the full 
burden. Buchanan (1967), Oates (1975), craig and Heins 
(1980), DiLorenzo (1982), Baker (1983), Breeden and Hunter 
4 
(1985), and Wagner (1976) have explored this form of 
illusion. 
In the case of debt illusion, fiscal illusion takes the 
form of an underperception of the discounted value of the 
future tax burdens attributable to current public 
expenditures that are financed by debt rather than by 
current taxes. 4 Such illusion should be manifested in the 
capitalized property values, which have been studied by 
Epple and Schipper (1981) for evidence of this form of· 
fiscal illusion. 
In the case of the flypaper effect, a term coined by 
Arthur Okun to denote the commonly observed phenomenon that 
"money sticks where it hits," lump-sum intergovernmental 
grants are seen to increase the level of expenditures of the 
fiscal agencies that receive them rather than being returned 
to the taxpayers to the degree they would prefer. The 
illusion takes the form of a false perception, fostered by 
budget-maximizing public officials, that the grant money, 
which does reduce the average tax-price of local public 
goods, reduces the more economically relevant marginal tax 
price of the local public goods. This form of fiscal 
illusion has been the subject of studies by courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979). 
4While this should result in higher public expenditures 
when debt is incurred, allowing testing within the same 
general framework as the other forms of illusion, the debt 
studies have taken an alternate approach. 
DiLorenzo has also considered an intriguing additional 
manifestation of fiscal illusion in which profits of 
municipally-owned utilities are used to subsidize local 
public spending, increasing the level of expenditure on 
local public goods because of the taxpayers' failure to 
perceive accurately that these profits could be returned to 
the citizens in the form of lower taxes. 
5 
Throughout the literature of fiscal illusion, 
descriptive and empirical, ad hoc definitions of the term 
fiscal illusion and hypotheses about its nature and 
consequences abound, varying with the manifestation being 
observed and with the individual observer of that 
manifestation. In addition, the existing treatments have 
utilized little of the theoretical apparatus of formal 
economics beyond Downs's demonstration that the small impact 
of a single vote and the high cost of obtaining and 
assimilating information would result in a high degree of 
"ratio.nal ignorance" among voters. The numerous empirical 
studies stand almost as islands, having little in the way of 
a unifying conceptual foundation. Oates (198Bb, 20) argues 
that the existing empirical work is flawed in its effort to 
detect and measure fiscal illusion by two particular 
problems: endogeneity of the illusion variable and 
competing hypotheses, particularly the hypothesis that the 
transaction costs of modifying budgetary parameters may 
account for the disparity between optimal, "rational" fiscal 
6 
decisions and the actual results observed. In his view, 
compelling empirical support for the existence and 
importance of fiscal illusion has not yet been established. 
These limitations of the existing literature provide scope 
for worthwhile contributions to the study of fiscal illusion 
and have provided the impetus for this work. 
III. Overview of This Work 
The next chapter presents a survey of the definitional 
variations found in the existing literature and analyzes 
some substantive implications of assumptions embodied in 
those definitions. It proposes a definition that will 
better serve the needs of those who seek to understand the 
phenomenon of fiscal illusion and to assess its import. 
Chapter Three applies fundamental theoretical tools of 
economic analysis to the concept of fiscal illusion, 
deriving additional insight into the nature and significance 
of fiscal illusion from the individual's consumer choice 
model and from the median voter collective choice model. 
Chapter Four explores a number of forces that limit the 
impact of fiscal illusion from both the consumer's and the 
supplier's perspective, many of which have received little 
attention in the existing literature. Finally, Chapter Five 
presents an empirical study of the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis, in which estimates of the dollar magnitudes of 
the state tax "windfalls" that resulted from the federal Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 are calculated and, in the estimated 
model, are found to exert no significant impact either upon 
the levels of state expenditures or upon changes in the 
levels of spending. Because the windfalls are exogenous, 
this finding is free from the simultaneity issues that have 
compromised existing empirical studies of fiscal illusion. 
The results are consistent with the proposition that 




DEFINING FISCAL ILLUSION 
I. Existing Definitions and a survey of 
the Issues Implicit in Them 
A search of the substantial literature on fiscal 
illusion for explicit and implicit definitions of the term 
fiscal illusion turns up few formal definitions and many 
variations in the concept to which the term is applied. 
Further exploration of this terminological imprecision in 
the existing litet:.a~rELreveals much more than just minor, 
technical concerns; the definitional vagueness reflects a 
deeper lack·of precision in the analysis of the subject and 
is evidence of the. need for a coherent, unified 
understanding of fiscal illusion in all its manifestations 
that can make a more uniform definition possible. 
The common thread in those definitions that do appear 
is that one or more fiscal parameters are perceived 
imperfectly in a way tha:t can generate a distorted, welfare-
reducing allocation of resources between the public sector 
and the private sector. 1 Within this framework, the 
1Illusion-induced distortions within the public sector 
seem of equal concern but have not been treated in the 
literature. Oates's inclusive phrase "distort fiscal 
choices" is an appealing one. 
8 
variations proliferate, diverging with respect to the 
source; the locus, nature and duration; the variables 
affected; and the direction of bias. 
9 
Writers may or may not attribute the source of fiscal 
illusion to an agent who intentionally promotes illusion and 
may or may not further specify such an agent's motivation or 
intent in creating the illusion. Puviani was careful to 
impute no intent to the agent, specifying explicitly an "2.2 
if sort of theoretical structure," operating under the 
hypothesis that "the government always acts to hide the 
burden of taxes from the public and to magnify the benefits 
of public expenditures." (Buchanan 1960, 60) For West and 
Winer the illusion is clearly intentional; they define 
fiscal illusion as "contrived" imperfect knowledge and note 
that McCulloch and Mill saw it as a valid governmental 
exercise to offset the naturally occurring illusion of 
public underestimation of benefits. West and Winer further 
explicitly posit a motive for the public official to be the 
source of illusion: maximization of the size of the public 
sector through illusion is an objective that permits the 
maximization of the political agent's utility. They also 
explicitly posit accurate perception on the part of the 
source of the illusion. For some observers the agent's 
greater accuracy of perception is a necessary characteristic 
of fiscal illusion, but in general writers do not raise the 
possibility of misperception on the part of such an agent. 
10 
Observers of fiscal illusion may also differ as to the 
locus of the misperception, varying in the degree of 
specificity as well as the type of individual who 
misperceives. They may find the locus in "individuals" 
(Ponunerehne and Schneider), "renters," "the consumer-
taxpayer" (DiLorenzo), "individual citizens" (Goetz), "the 
electorate" (Oates), the average voter (Downs), "consumer-
voters" (Munley and Greene), the "median voter," (West and 
Winer) or the "voter-taxpayer-beneficiary" (Buchanan) -- or 
they may fail to specify who misperceives. As suggested 
above, it is conceivable that misperception may extend to a 
self-interested agent who tries to manipulate voter 
misperceptions to his own benefit, conceivable even that his 
owri-misperception may exceed that of the voters. Whether 
such an agent may also misperceive and how he is to be 
distinguished from the individual-citizen-voter-taxpayer-
consumer-beneficiary are subjects that are not addressed. 
Observers also differ as to the nature of the imperfection 
in the misperception: for West and Winer it is merely 
imperfect knowledge~ for Oates it is biased perception, and 
for Buchanan, who explicitly rules out mere ignorance, it is 
"false conception," but in general the nature of the 
misperception is not specified in any precise way. Writers 
further differ as to whether the misperception persists over 
time. Some simply do not address this concern, but both 
Oates and carter consider it a necessary characteristic, 
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while West and Winer view it as an empirical issue. 
Definitional differences occur with respect to the 
variable which is misperceived, sometimes according to the 
different categories of fiscal illusion addressed earlier 
(complexity of revenue source, renter illusion, debt 
illusion, etc.), but, further, within a given category 
writers often disagree on the precise specification of the 
variable. so, for one just "the tax price" of the public 
good or service is the concern (DiLorenzo's "true tax-price 
of local public goods and services," Carter's "price of 
collective activities," Martinez-Vasquez's "tax-costs'' and 
Munley and Greene's reference to Wagner's "perceived prices 
of the public good"). Another, like Oates, may specify the 
marginal tax price, and yet another may stress the 
subjective burdens and benefits of public expenditures and 
receipts as Pommerehne and Schneider alone do in referring 
to "the size of the burden of taxes and other public 
receipts and of the benefit returned for public 
expenditures." 
Further differences2 are found in the specification of 
the fiscal variable which is ultimately affected by the 
misperception (which may or may not be the same as the 
variable which is misperceived) and in the direction of the 
impact, even when the affected variable is the same. Thus, 
2These may not be conceptually "definitional," though 
they are treated as definitional by some authors. 
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many focus on the effect that misperception of the tax price 
has upon the level of expenditure. Within this group, 
Munley and Greene and Pommerehne and Schneider emphasize 
that expenditure can go in either direction: Carter, 
Buchanan, and Wagner, on the other hand say increases in 
expenditure result. While for Oates fiscal illusion "may 
distort significantly fiscal choices by the electorate," 
Buchanan's use of the term implies a fiscal phenomenon that 
is distorted. While the term "systematic" is used by 
several writers, including Goetz, Oates, and Pommerehne and 
Schneider, to describe the misperception, nowhere is that 
term operationally defined. 
The lack of a consensus on the definition of fiscal 
illusion handicaps attempts to assess the existing body of 
work on it. The failure of observers to define the concept 
consistently and precisely or to develop a theory of fiscal 
illusion has allowed untenable preconceptions to be 
maintained. Exploration of the definitional variations 
brings important issues concerning the assessment of the 
extent and significance of fiscal illusion into focus, and 
provides an important foundation for the development of a 
theory of fiscal illusion. 
II. Implications of Definitional Issues: Aggregation 
One situation in which the definitional imprecision 
reflects serious analytical issues lies in the specification 
13 
of who misperceives. Since different individuals can be 
expected to have different degrees of misperception, whose 
misperception should count and how heavily should it count? 
Some insight into this question can be gleaned by 
considering how differing subjective valuations, possibly 
originating from differing degrees of information, are 
weighted in other institutional frameworks. By 
distinguishing between the market's behavior and the 
behavior of the average individual who participates in that 
market, Frederic Mishkin {1981, 295) has demonstrated that, 
"Not all market participants have to be rational in order 
for a market to display rational expectations." He then 
directly applies this insight to market forecasts, 
demonstrating that the presence of irrationality in survey 
forecasts does not in itself imply that market forecasts are 
also irrational. Though Mishkin's analysis and testing are 
conducted in the context of financial markets• efficiency in 
predicting inflation and short-term interest rates, his 
ideas are directly and importantly applicable to the 
analysis of fiscal illusion, particularly to attempts to 
assess its importance. While empirical studies attempting 
to assess its importance have been less than compelling, 
observers have generally presumed it to be important, and 
seldom has anyone arisen to question that presumption of 
significance. 
14 
The pervasive sense of the importance of fiscal 
illusion seems to stem from two main sources. One source is 
the "casual empiricism" of a long succession of writers who, 
since the early 20th century, have expressed concern over 
the failure of voters to evaluate accurately the various 
costs and benefits of fiscal choices. 3 Though not always 
expressly formulated in such terms, 4 the concern they 
express is over the pervasiveness and the high average level 
of inaccuracy in appraising information relevant to fiscal 
choices. The same impression of widespread ignorance and 
the potential it creates for bad fiscal outcomes generates 
concern in observers today. Each of us can point to ample 
numbers of friends and colleagues who have but little 
awareness of the civic decisions, local, state, and 
national, around us. Many of us are concerned that we 
ourselves have too little knowledge of the issues. 
A second source of the compelling interest generated by 
the idea of fiscal illusion is the analytical support 
provided by Anthony Downs's work demonstrating that, for an 
3They generally report observations of an ill-informed 
public, but not of someone actively, successfully 
misinforming the public. It is the ignorance itself, rather 
than the damaging manipulation of that ignorance, that is 
usually the focus. They do find a net, damaging impact on 
the fiscal variable of concern, usually the level of public 
expenditures. 
4At times the concern is expressly stated this way, as 
when Tullock (1977, 287) discusses the idea that "the 
average individual gravely underestimates the cost to him of 
individual government services." 
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individual, being uninformed is optimal in view of the costs 
of information and the small average impact of an 
individual's vote. 5 Because of this small average impact, 
voters rationally choose to expend little time and energy in 
becoming informed and therefore exhibit a high average level 
of ignorance. In both of these sources, there is an 
emphasis on the high average level of inaccurate or 
imperfect information. In the citizenry, even in the much 
smaller and significantly less ignorant subset of voting 
citizens, the total amount of ignorance seems overwhelming. 
Certainly, it seems, so much ignorance cannot be consistent 
with wise political decisions. 
The germ of an important caveat to this inference can 
be derived from Mishkin's analysis of the work of financial 
market researchers, who found widespread irrationality in 
survey forecasts of both inflation and short-term interest 
rates and who concluded that the survey results are 
inconsistent with the rationality of market expectations and 
with the efficiency of financial markets. What Mishkin 
demonstrated is that this finding of irrationality in the 
survey forecasts does not in itself imply that market 
5some limitations of this analysis's use of the average 
impact upon the outcome has been recognized in treatments 
that evaluate the voter's marginal impact by showing that in 
close elections, voting participation increases; as yet, 
though, the question of whether close elections increase the 
accuracy of voters' perceptions of fiscal parameters has not 
itself been explored. 
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forecasts are also irrational. The crucial issue is how 
individual perceptions are aggregated. What determines 
survey results is average behavior of the participants; each 
individual's perception receives an equal weight. In 
contrast, what dominates market results is the marginal 
participant's behavior; his perception alone is the 
determining one. "· •• [M]arket efficiency does not 
require that all participants in the market are rational and 
use information efficiently" (Mishkin 1981, 297). The 
single condition that Mishkin does find necessary to ensure 
that "the market will behave as though expectations are 
rational despite irrational participants in that market" is 
that "unexploited profit opportunities [be] eliminated by 
~ [italics mine] participants in a market" (Mishkin 1981, 
295). Thus, the arbitrage of even a single participant can 
dominate the market outcome; the high levels of average and 
total ignorance in themselves need have no effect at all 
upon the market outcome. 6 
Caution is warranted in assessing fiscal illusion. 
High levels of average and total ignorance among citizens 
and the presence of widespread misinformation do not 
6Though an efficient outcome will result, the pattern 
of ignorance/rationality will have distributional effects 
for those individuals involved -- both those who misperceive 
values and those others who overcome their imperfect 
perceptions. Incentives to avoid (or to overcome) such 
misperceptions will be affected by those distributional 
consequences. 
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necessarily imply biased fiscal outcomes. Judgments about 
whether they can be consistent with wise political decisions 
must rest upon the analysis of the mechanism by which 
individual perceptions are aggregated within the fiscal 
arena. Great care is needed in determining whose 
misperceptions should count and how heavily to weight 
various individuals' differing degrees of misperception. 
Chapters Three and Four of this work address that issue. 
Moreover, with an awareness that our "sense" of the 
importance of fiscal illusion may be based on a logical 
fallacy, the case for its significance must be made on more 
scientific grounds. Compelling empirical support for the 
existence and importance of fiscal illusion is needed. 
Chapter Five provides some new empirical findings. 
These insights have immediate application in appraising 
some of the issues in the literature of fiscal illusion. 
For example, Buchanan's "presumption that fiscal choice 
should result from individual behavior which is as rational 
as is possible," (if the term rational is taken to mean free 
of illusion, and if the term individual behavior is taken to 
mean the behavior of all individuals -- and Buchanan does 
not suggest any other interpretation) , is questionable. 
Mishkin's insights suggest that not all individuals' 
behavior need be rational for the efficient provision of 
public goods and services. It may well be that a high level 
18 
of misperception, of individual "irrationality," is in fact 
consistent with rational collective choice. Further, should 
we find that illusion does distort fiscal choices, we must 
not simply look to whatever measures will raise average 
awareness of fiscal variables: such measures will not 
necessarily improve the outcome. Again we must identify 
those particular agents whose awareness will have the 
greatest impact at the least cost. 
These insights shed light in other corners. A curious 
thing has happened to the term fiscal illusion over the 
years: its articles have disappeared. James Buchanan 
(1960, 59-64) began by writing of "the fiscal illusion," of 
"a fiscal illusion, 11 • and of "fiscal illusions," as if the 
referent were a phenomenon, one that fooled people, as does 
the magic trick that is performed by the illusionist on 
stage. Today's writers generally speak instead of "fiscal 
illusion," and the reference is to the misperception within 
the minds of those who observe the phenomenon rather than 
the phenomenon itself. This definitional difference is 
related to the aggregation issue set forth above. 
Buchanan's "fiscal illusion" implies that individuals' 
perceptions have an aggregated, collective impact that 
distorts the value of some fiscal parameter, though he does 
not specify how that aggregation is achieved. Today's 
"fiscal illusion" goes back one step to the disaggregated 
19 
perceptions within the individual observers' minds. The 
aggregation process, and often its result as well, are thus 
left unspecified. 
The distinction between the two referents is not always 
maintained, however. Buchanan's statement that "as a 
normative proposition, all fiscal illusions must be 
removed, 11 seems perfectly reasonable, 7 given the 
understanding that his referent is the phenomena 
themselves. 8 But the statement is misleading and suggests 
either inappropriate remedies or an irremediable source of 
nonoptimality, if one understands the term fiscal illusion 
to refer to the misperceptions in the minds of the 
observers. 
The need for a better understanding of the aggregation 
issue is also apparent in the current literature. In the 
April 1987 issue of Public Finance Quarterly, Cullis and 
Jones attempt to resolve the debate between the starkly 
contrasting views of those who posit that overestimation of 
costs and underestimation of benefits lead to an 
7with the reservation that it be possible to remove the 
illusion at a cost that is less that the costs associated 
with the continuance of the illusion. 
~owhere in this selection does Buchanan explicitly 
define fiscal illusion. His uses of the term are·consistent 
with the interpretation of his definition as an inaccurately 
perceived objective phenomenon that alters people's 
behavior. 
"underexpanded" public sector and those who believe that 
underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits 
cause it to be "overexpanded. 119 It is clear that the 
question of whether misperception has an impact upon the 
size of public budgets involves an implicit mechanism 
20 
whereby individual perceptions are aggregated to generate a 
collective decision upon budget size. 
The evidence brought to bear on this issue, however, is 
direct survey evidence on individual fiscal perceptions 
taken from a study of the public's comprehension of 
expenditure and taxation measures in the United Kingdom, in 
particular the main things governments spend their money on 
and where governments get the money to pay for services. 
Cullis and Jones conclude that the survey evidence suggests 
"a thick but fairly evenly spread layer of ignorance over 
the public sector," and, further, that the evidence does not 
support the dominance of either overall optimistic or 
pessimistic tax illusions or aggregate bias in the knowledge 
of taxes and expenditures. They add that "the general lack 
9of linguistic and conceptual interest is that in the 
opening paragraphs Cullis and Jones, like the early writers, 
refer to "fiscal illusions" in the sense of "tricks," fiscal 
phenomena that mislead people, such as the use of a complex 
tax structure to obscure the tax burden. This usage implies 
that the phenomenon embodies an aggregated impact of 
individual misperceptions, but no aggregation mechanism is 
specified. (In the article, Cullis and Jones use the term 
"aggregated" to refer to totals of expenditures and revenues 
as distinct from their components or structure. My usage is 
that of the earlier part of this chapter, referring to the 
combining of individuals' perceptions.) 
21 
of knowledge supports only the argument that rational voters 
will not invest time and effort in the accumulation of 
information," Downs's proposition. The aggregation 
mechanism of the survey that is their source of evidence, 
however, weights all individuals' perceptions equally, in 
contrast to the aggregation mechanism of the decision-making 
process that determines fiscal outcomes. This disparity 
needs to be explicitly addressed. As the earlier argument 
of this section suggested, the disparity makes the evidence 
used by Cullis and Jones irrelevant to the question they are 
trying to answer. This evidence in no way demonstrates that 
the decisive voters will not invest time and effort in the 
accumulation of information, but only that voters on average 
will not. Neither bias in overall illusion nor the thick 
"layer of ignorance" can provide evidence on the dominance 
of illusion in fiscal outcomes. Because it fails to address 
the impact of the illusio~ upon the outcome of the 
collective choice mechanism, this study, at best, 
contributes nothing to the empirical assessment of the 
importance of fiscal illusion; at worst, it misleads. 
III. Implications of Definitional Issues: 
The Source's Motivation and Knowledge 
Another major analytical issue which manifests itself 
in the definitional variations lies in the predominant 
assumption that political agents know the fiscal reality and 
that they intentionally distort that reality to further 
their own ends. Two related points may be developed 
concerning fiscal agents' intent to distort reality. 
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The first point is that selfish intent can be 
consistent with the public good. Like Adam Smith's butchers 
and the financial markets' arbitrageurs, fiscal agents may 
under some circumstances serve others in pursuing their own 
self-interest: furthermore, they may do so not by 
proliferating fiscal illusion but by limiting its sway. The 
potential and actual competition of other political agents 
may prevent the actualization of one agent's own ends at the 
expense of the general populace. The mechanism by which 
individual perceptions are aggregated in the fiscal arena is 
again crucial to this issue. Chapter Four extends this 
analogy between market and political competition and 
examines its role in the outcome of the public choice 
mechanism. 
The second point is that the narrowing of the 
definition of fiscal illusion to situations in which 
political agents who are its source perceive fiscal reality 
more accurately than their constituents artificially 
isolates the analysis of fiscal illusion from important, 
closely related situations. 10 It is possible that the 
10Even an assumption that their knowledge is more 
accurate than that of their constituents involves, again, an 
aggregation issue (with the average of the constituents' 
knowledge the implicit assumption). 
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political agent misperceives reality, and that in an attempt 
to distort this misperceived "reality" in order to benefit 
himself, he may in fact bring others closer to the truth. 
Alternatively, he may misperceive reality and, in trying 
with good intent t~ inform, create damaging fiscal illusion. 
For example, one could argue that the War on Poverty was led 
by public officials who mistakenly perceived that its 
measures would generate greater benefits than they in fact 
did, and that in persuading the citizens that those greater 
benefits did exist in an effort to improve the nation's 
wellbeing, they in fact created fiscal illusion that 
effectively reduced the nation's wellbeing instead. In this 
case of fiscal illusion the promulgators of the illusion 
were almost certainly subject to the illusion themselves. 
To the extent that they benefited selfishly from their 
illusion-based actions, in accordance with the Niskanen/ 
Buchanan point of view, they had less incentive to find the 
truth themselves. Selfish incentives reinforced altruistic 
ones, as the programs intended to "do good" provided jobs 
and perquisites for the do-gooders. The fiscal illusion we 
have the most to fear from may well be that which all agents 
believe in, where we are all ignorant of the truth. 11 Downs 
11 In a different context, one could argue that those 
who mistakenly believed that expansive fiscal and monetary 
policies would reduce unemployment and increase output 
without a seriously damaging rise in inflation, in trying 
(with the intent of informing the public and promoting the 
general welfare) to promote those policies, created serious 
fiscal illusion that ended only with the Fed's 1979 
argues that public officials have better incentives and 
opportunity to know reality, but this argument belongs to 
the analysis of illusion. To rule out these other 
possibilities in the definition of the term rather that 
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subjecting them to analysis is inappropriate. Exploring the 
forces that helped unveil those illusions may illuminate the 
mechanisms by which illusion works. 
Further, fiscal illusion may have no conscious 
"source." It may simply exist, an accidental byproduct of· 
the world of phenomena and perception. It may nonetheless 
have serious consequences; it may, moreover, be amenable to 
human actions to counteract its deleterious effects. The 
importance and the policy implications of fiscal illusion 
are separable from the nature and intent of its source. 
Indeed, Chapter Four will discuss "demand" forces that place 
limits on the sway of fiscal illusion independently of any 
"provider" or "source" of illusion. Narrowing one's concern 
to an agent who intentionally acts as a source of illusion, 
or even to that illusion which emanates from a human source, 
whether unwittingly or inte~tionally, is a valid exercise, 
but it should not obscure the existence and possible 
importance of other "sourceless" illusion. 
reversion to strict limits on the expansion of the money 
supply. 
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IV. A Proposed Definition of Fiscal Illusion 
A more restrained definition of fiscal illusion avoids 
preempting these valid issues. The simple definition of 
fiscal illusion I propose is "the misperception by one or 
more individuals of the value of one or more fiscal 
parameters." No specifications of source, locus, nature, 
duration, variables affected, or direction of bias are 
presumed, and none are precluded. The one or more 
individuals may include ordinary citizens and practicing 
politicians alike. The misperception may be greater in one 
individual than another. It may be used intentionally to 
mislead others in order to promote one individual's own 
selfish interest at the expense o~ others, but need not do 
so. Its existence may be consistent with the good of all. 
This broad definition of fiscal illusion serves all 
uses served by the variations of the definition currently in 
use. In encompassing them, it emphasizes their common 
features and the analytical elements that are applicable to 
them all. Further, since fiscal ignorance cannot be 
operationally distinguished from illusion, the proposed 
definition encompasses it along with all other potential 
sources of misperception. 
Establishment of a consensus on this comprehensive and 
workable definition would fill one void in the literature of 
fiscal illusion. It would promote the clarification of the 
implicit assumptions of various studies and the appropriate 
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qualifications of the results that those assumptions imply. 
Understanding of the conceptual issues that resulted in this 
definition would allow more accurate interpretation of the 
existing literature; consensus on a uniform, broadly 
applicable definition would avoid ambiguity in current and 
future discussions of fiscal illusion. 
This comprehensive definition also provides the thrust 
for the broad view of the effects of fiscal illusion and of 
the· limitations on its sway found within this work. 
V. A Special Case 
Within the universe of possible manifestations of 
fiscal illusion encompassed by the proposed definition, 
there is one set that has been the source of particular 
concern in the illusion literature. That concern is that 
public officials who know the true values of fiscal 
parameters will intentionally distort citizens' perceptions 
of them in order to benefit themselves at the public's 
expense. This is indeed a special case in that it presumes 
many specific attributes of the illusion situation: 
that politicians have a more accurate perception of 
the fiscal parameters, 
that politicians can effectively manipulate 
citizens' perceptions, 
that greater inaccuracy in citizens' perceptions is 
what will be to the politician's benefit, and 
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~hat the manipulation is to the citizens' detriment. 
The seriousness of this concern will be specifically 
addressed in Chapters Four and Five, but the more general 
definition of fiscal illusion proposed here and the ensuing 
analysis do, appropriately, encompass alternative 
assumptions about each of these aspects of the illusion 
situation. 
The importance of a more general treatment may be seen 
in an example. If a public official accurately perceives 
that a higher pay scale for public school teachers will be 
the best way to achieve an unanimously desired improvement 
in the quality of the educational system, but the public 
underestimates the importance of those salaries, and if the 
public official then educates the citizens about current pay 
scales and the pay scales in competing jurisdictions and 
occupations so that they too clearly perceive the need for 
increases and vote both to increase the educational budget 
to provide for the pay raises and to reelect the politician 
who has brought about this result, then everyone gains. In 
this case a politician benefits by manipulating citizens' 
perceptions in ways that generate greater accuracy in their 
perceptions and result in an increased level of government 
expenditures, and everyone is better off as a result. 
The study of fiscal illusion should encompass this 
special case as well, not only for logical completeness but 
also for a very real practical reason. Any proposals that 
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attempt to alleviate the concern in the first special case 
by reducing the politician's ability to mislead the public 
need at the same time to maintain the politician's ability 
to pursue a mutual interest by improving the accuracy of 
citizens' perceptions in the second special case. They are 
opposite sides of the same coin. We need to ask whether we 
can limit the power to "manipulate" in the one case without 
restricting the ability to "persuade" in the other. We may 
further ask whether we do not gain if the politician sees 
that he can achieve the same result at a lower cost by 
misleading the people and does so. Indeed, as mentioned 
earlier, Mill and McCulloch argued that illusions created by 
public officials may improve wellbeing by counteracting the 
public's misperceptions of the benefits of public goods. 
From this point of departure we move on to the 
theoretical analysis of fiscal illusion, broadly construed 
and broadly applicable. 
CHAPTER THREE 
FISCAL ILLUSION AND THE CONSUMER OF PUBLIC GOODS: 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
It seems curious that the analysis of fiscal illusion 
generally proceeds without the use of the standard tools of 
microeconomic theory. Buchanan's discussions describe the 
instruments of fiscal illusion and posit that they allow 
increases in governmental expenditures without describing 
how the tools have their impact upon the citizens' decision-
making processes or how they conform to the utility-
maximizing principle for the person who promulgates the 
illusions. Wagner bases his analysis on philosophical and 
psychological theories that are not an integral part of 
economic analysis. West·and Winer derive a new set of 
diagrams specifically tailored to the. variables they are 
concerned with. Pommerehne and Schneider use a statistical 
approach that is not explicitly grounded in theory. In this 
sort of ad hoc analysis, behavioral assumptions that are 
implicit in diagrams or statistical models can have 
consequences for the results that are not readily 
understood. The tools of basic microeconomic theory have 
the substantial advantage that their long and widespread use 
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has revealed many of their subtle implications and 
limitations. Placing the issue of fiscal illusion in a 
median voter context and examining it with even elementary 
tools of analysis clarifies some important issues and 
illuminates some important relationships. 
I. Cost Illusion within the Perspective of the consumer 
Choice Model and the Median Voter Model 
The standard median voter model with single-peaked 
preferences can be illustrated in a diagram like that in 
Figure 3-1. The level of provision of public goods and 
G 
FIGURE 3-1 
services is shown on the horizontal axis. The utility of 
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the individual voters is shown on the vertical axis; levels 
of utility for different individuals need not be comparable. 
Uj(G) and its characteristic shape are derived from the 
individual's indifference map. Gj* is individual j's most 
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preferred level of provision of public goods and services. 
It is worth noting that this depiction differs from the 
standard diagram, which measures the level of the budget, B, 
on the horizontal axis, with u1(B) measured vertically. 
Although much of the discussion of fiscal illusion focuses 
on the level of expenditure on public goods and services, 
using the level of provision of the public goods and 
services makes the theoretical analysis more tractable: it 
allows us to maintain the standard approach to the 
indifference curve analysis of consumer choice1 and to keep 
the terminology of the median voter analysis consistent with 
it. Different levels of the budget may be assumed to 
correspond to different quantities of the public good, B = 
f(G), with~B/dG > 0, i.e., with a positive, though not 
necessarily linear, relationship between the quantity of the 
public good and the expenditure on it. The exact 
relationship will depend upon the resource prices and the 
production function that relates the amounts of purchased 
inputs to the output of G. 
The focus on the level of expenditure also generally 
obscures the question of how that level of expenditure is 
related to the level of public revenues. It is usually 
1In the consumer choice model, it is the real 
opportunity cost that is embodied in the possibilities 
frontier relating G and Xj. Use of B instead of G would 
embody assumptions about price that would need to be 
explicitly stipulated and would .limit the applicability of 
the model. 
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implicitly assumed that they are equal and, further, that 
tax shares are constant and do not vary with the level of 
expenditure. In this analysis the tax shares are assumed to 
be impiicit in the level of expenditure (though not 
necessarily constant), as if the decision of how to finance 
is one with the decision to spend. If financing decisions 
are separable and variable, the analysis would require 
further modification. 
To view the significance of fiscal illusion for the 
collective choice situation depicted in Figure 3-1, a good 
starting point is the choice model for the typical 
individual whose utility curve appears in the median voter 
diagram. It will allow us to determine Uj(G) in the absence 
of illusion, which will provide a useful point of reference 
for the discussion of the effects of fiscal illusion. 




alternative combinations of the public good and some 
composite private good, X; the usual convex indifference 
curves are shown. They reflect the nature of the utility 
function that registers the level of satisfaction generated 
by any combination of private goods and publicly provided 
goods amd services. The opportunity frontier reflects the 
production function that measures the output of those 
publicly provided goods and services obtainable from 
alternative combinations of inputs. It is drawn concave to 
the origin, reflecting the increasing marginal tax cost of 
additional units of G to individual j. 
Further discussion of this treatment of the opportunity 
locus is in order. The alternative combinations of the two 
types of goods and the tradeoff between them are shown in 
real terms. In the usual framework of the market, these are 
derived from the market prices of the goods and the 
individual's income, which are all measured in dollar 
values. Standard choice theory assumes that prices are 
givens for the individual; except in the special case in 
which there is a degree of monopoly power, the price does 
not change as the number of units the individual chooses to 
consume varies. As a consequence of these assumptions, the 
budget constraint is then depicted as a straight line. This 
usual budget line of constant slope is implied by those, 
e.g., Wagner, who posit an illusion·mechanism in which 
misperception of the price of the public good causes a non-
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optimal quantity to be consumed. In fact, much of the 
literature of fiscal illusion is couched in the terminology 
and the conceptual framework of prices and quantities that 
are like those observed in a competitive market. 
Two difficulties arise from this approach to prices and 
quantities as applied to public goods and services; both 
stem from the fact that units of the public good are not 
always clearly defined. Seldom is a public good a 
homogeneous one that, like shirts or automobiles~ can be 
varied in quantity by replicating individual units; instead, 
with outputs like parks, flood control, or police services, 
variation in quantity generally takes the less precise form 
of a more extensive provision, either in quality or in 
quantity, of something voters value. Thus the concept of 
price, a payment per {homogeneous) unit, is hard to define 
here and should be conceived of, instead, as an increment in 
the tax payment of the individual in question as the level 
of provision of the public good.increases. The units on the 
quantity axis are likewise to be conceived of as measuring 
increases in the level of provision of the public good. In 
applied work, the specification of units gives rise to some 
particularly difficult measurement problems, and a small 
literature has arisen concerning these problems. 2 
2Jackson and Barnett (1987) attempt to resolve the 
difficulties in the measurement of public service outputs in 
the context of local government provision of local public 
services characterized by face-to-face provision. 
The second difficulty is that while a price in a 
competitive market is a constant average and marginal 
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payment made by the buyer that does not vary with the 
individual's choice of the number of units to purchase 
because he is such a small part of the market, for a public 
good the average and marginal tax cost to the individual is 
more likely to vary with the number of units consumed. 
Assuming that tax shares are constant, marginal tax cost to 
individual j might be expected to increase due to a rising 
marginal opportunity cost of the public good as more and 
more resources that are less well-suited to its provision 
must be employed in its provision. Elasticity of resource 
supplies is the underlying determining force in this 
element. Such a rising marginal tax ,cost gives rise to the 
concave opportunity locus depicted here. A second possible 
source of a rising marginal opportunity cost is a tax share 
which is not constant but which, for individual j, rises 
with the level of provision of public goods. 3 
With this possibilities curve superimposed on 
individual j•s indifference map in Figure 3-2, the point of 
tangency between the opportunity locus and his indifference 
curve, at G1*, x1*, generates the highest level of utility 
3Economies of scale could alter at least part of this 
picture, reducing the concavity of the opportunity locus, or 
even, if extensive enough, resulting in a convex opportunity 
locus. 
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* attainable by j, u1(G1 ). Other levels of u1(G) can be read 
from the intersections of the opportunity locus with the 
indifference curves as the level of G is varied. This 
rising, then falling, though not necessarily symmetric, 
pattern of u1 can be graphed on axes relating Uj to the 
level of G. 4 The same sort of optimizing process, with the 
resulting, characteristic Uj(G) curve can be carried out for 
each voter and displayed in Figure 3-1. The altitudes of 
the individual utility curves for the different voters 
depicted in Figure 3-1 are not commensurate among voters, 
but this limitation does not affect how the curves function 
in the model. 
We can introduce illusion into this optimization 
process in a variety of ways. Consider first the effects of 
cost illusion, in which the individual perceives only a 
fraction of the true tax cost. 5 The perceived tax cost 
depends upon the.perceptions of the prices and amounts of 
purchased inputs used to provide the public.goods and 
services and upon the perception of the amounts of taxes 
4strictly convex indifference curves and concave (or 
straight) budget lines will generate only single-peaked 
ui (G) curves. 
5This is the case that has been most fully explored in 
the literature. It is also possible that perceived tax 
costs overstate the true tax costs -- that taxpayers 
perceive marginal taxes as higher than they really are. In 
that case analogous results would be expected. 
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paid. In this case, except at the X intercept itself, the 
perceived transformation curve lies further from the origin 
than the actual transformation curve, and a new tangency 
point is shown. 6 The illusion-altered perception generates 
I 
three different consequences: 
G 
FIGURE 3-3 
1) The individual sees himself as able to 
achieve a higher level of utility than 
he is able to achieve in reality. In 
fact, for any given level of G except o, 
the associated Uj(G) perceived as 
attainable rises. 
~he analysis here is developed with only this very 
general restriction on the relationship between the 
perceived and the actual transformation curves. Some 
further possibilities.concerning the nature and extent of 
the discrepancy between the two curves are developed later 
in this chapter. 
L 
2) The optimizing level of G increases, 
under illusion, to G/*. 
3) The level of private goods perceived as 
optimal, Xj * may rise, fall, or remain 
the same. 
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The first two results are manifested directly in the Uj(G) 
curve that appears in the median voter diagram. The third, 
the behavior of X, raises one possibility that is worth 
pursuing if the perceived optimal xj* increases. Such an 
increase implies both that more resources are devoted to its 
production and that, in reality, though not necessarily 
under illusion, fewer are used in the production of G. 
Viewed from a standard demand theory perspective, 7 this is 
the case of inelastic demand for a good or service, a 
decrease in the price of which results in a lower 
expenditure on it. An ill·usion-induced perception of lower 
cost that extends to all units of the public good may well 
give rise to a willingness to vote only for a smaller level 
of expenditures on purchased inputs for the provision of 
those goods and services, in spite of a higher desired level 
of G. If this is an accurate analysis, it would imply that 
the budget-maximizing politician's own self-interest would 
prevent him from creating an illusion of lower cost in all 
7though Chapter Four will argue that differences in the 
institutional framework make that approach an inappropriate 
one. 
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cases in which the demand is inelastic, yet this is the very 
case which studies find true for public goods in general. 
That this perception of a lower total cost for a higher 
level of output must be contradicted by reality suggests 
that it may be anticipated by the voters themselves, as is 
true even for the case in which X decreases, but not to the 
extent required by the greater level of G preferred, the 
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FIGURE 3-4 
8This possibility raises some troublesome issues for 
the empirical analysis of illusion. It suggests that 
misperception of price (cost) need not bias expenditures 
upward, as generally posited in the analysis and testing of 
hypotheses. The misallocation may still exist and be 
important without being manifested in the level of 
expenditure. This possibility is not important to the 
windfall case in this analysis, ·where the illusion is with 
respect to income rather than price, but it does raise 
questions about those studies whose illusion mechanism 
involves an underperception of price. 
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For individual j, the dotted Uj(G) curve in Figure 3-4 
embodies the first two effects of illusion: it lies above 
the original, solid curve for all values of G, and it 
reaches its maximum at a higher value of G. The greater the 
illusion, the greater the disparity between the illusion 
values and values based on accurate perceptions. 
All individuals who are subject to the same sort of 
illusion will have similar shifts in their Uj(G) curves. 
Though the degree of the shift will vary with the shape of 
the indifference curves and the severity of the illusion, 
the general position of the new curve will always reflect 
the first two results listed earlier. 
II. Implications for the Importance of Illusion 
In this context of the median voter model, it is 
possible at this point to demonstrate some important 
implications for those concerned with the effects of fiscal 
illusion upon the allocation of resources and the resulting 
level of social welfare. These underscore the previous 
discussion of the crucial importance of the method of 
aggregating individual choices that are subject to illusion. 
It is possible that even very pervasive and substantial 
illusion may have no impact upon fiscal decisions. This 
proposition is easily demonstrated by example. Figure 3-5 
reproduces Figure 3-1, depicting the solid Ui(G) curves for 




upon these are dotted u1(G) curves embodying a high degree 
of illusion in a large number of voters. The single voter 
who is free from illusion is the voter with the median of 
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the most-preferred outcomes. He casts the decisive vote in 
this setting, and his illusion -- no illusion -- is 
decisive. The outcome here is unchanged by illusion, in 
spite of the pervasiveness and the high average level of 
illusion, and even though the situation depicted here would 
.generate survey evidence of widespread and substantial 
illusion. 
Two elements affect the ability of fiscal illusion to 
distort fiscal outcomes. The illusion must make a 
difference in the level of provision of public goods and 
services perceived as optimal. That element is present in 
this situation: for individuals other than voter MV the 
illusion has an impact, sometimes a great one, with Gj** 
• lying well to the right of Gj • In addition to this, there 
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is a second element: the collective choice mechanism must 
give weight to those individuals whose illusion has a 
significant impact upon their perceived optimal level of G. 
In this example, the collective choice setting renders that 
potentially large impact of illusion ineffectual. If the 
individual is not decisive for the median voter situation, 
then, with respect to his effect upon the outcome allocation 
of resources to public goods, there is neither the need nor 
the incentive for him to alter his flawed perception or his 
voting behavior. 9 
Just as a high average level of illusion need not have 
an impact upon the median voter outcome, it is conceivable 
that a low level of total and average illusion may accompany 
an outcome that is significantly affected by illusion. 
Again, the proposition is easily demonstrated by example. 
* * ** * G2 . . • GHV GMV GMV+1 GMV+2 
FIGURE 3-6 
9chapter Four explores the existence of other 
incentives to reduce or eliminate his illusion. 
G 
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In Figure 3-6 the single voter subject to illusion is the 
one with the median of the most-preferred outcomes. Subject 
to illusion, he chooses G**, which becomes the new level of 
public goods for all individuals. His illusion alone has a 
decisive impact upon the outcome. 10 Once again, we may note 
that survey evidence would give a misleading impression of 
the importance of fiscal illusion. 11 
These two extreme cases are intended not as realistic 
paradigms but as illustrations of general precepts about 
average levels of illusion and survey evidence within a 
median voter framework. A more realistic view of the median 
voter spectrum will include a multitude of individuals, with 
a distribution (possibly a random one) of degrees of 
illusion. 12 In this case the sort of illusion depicted in 
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 may change the location of the median of 
the most-preferred outcomes. It may also change the 
10similarly, it can be shown that perceptions which are 
on the average unbiased may result in distorted fiscal 
choices, and that perceptions which are biased on the 
average may not result in distorted fiscal choices. This is 
another manifestation of the definitional concerns with 
biasedness encountered earlier. 
11Again, even in this situation, there are other forces 
that can be expected to place some limits upon the sway of 
illusion. These forces are the subject of Chapter Four. 
12Chapter Four will argue that, while individuals with 
most-preferred outcomes far from the median of the most-
preferred outcomes may indeed have an arbitrary illusion 
distribution, there are forces that limit the illusion of 
those voters close to it, who are most likely to have an 
impact upon the outcome. 
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identity of the individual to whose most-preferred outcome 
that median value corresponds, as wello In the more 
realistic case, there will be a group of individuals whose 
illusion is crucial to the outcome, and the analysis in the 
following pages will be applicable to that group of 
individuals. 13 
What these two simplified special cases serve to 
demonstrate is that the aggregation mechanism is of crucial 
importance to the impact of fiscal illusion upon the outcome 
and that the analysis of the incentives of the average voter 
may not be relevant to the forces impinging upon the much 
smaller group of potentially decisive voters whose 
valuations are crucial for the fiscal outcome. To 
paraphrase Mishkin's conclusion, it is not necessary that 
all individuals be rational for the political outcome to be 
rational. 
III. The Welfare Effects of Illusion and Their Implications 
for Agents Who May Dispel "Illusion 
The case in which the individual who is subject to 
illusion does cast the decisive vote merits further 
examination. If his vote is decisive, the standard "fiscal 
13As before, it is only to the extent that this group 
of voters affects the average level of illusion that it or 
survey evidence is relevant to the outcome. In this case, 
though, with more individuals being potentially decisive, 
they will carry a heavier weight in the average. 
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illusion hypothesis" predicts that the outcome of the 
collective choice mechanism will reflect his choice of the 
higher level of G induced by the illusion of a lower price. 
There is a contradiction buried in this apparently simple 
result that should not be ignored. Though the voter 
perceives the budget line under the influence of illusion 
and makes his choice of Gj ** on the basis of that flawed 
perception, in reality the budget line remains as originally 





level of public goods requires the reduction of private 
goods consumed not just to the level expected in the 
illusion model, but further, to the level indicated by the 
. ** actual opportun1ty locus, Xj • The true cost must be paid 
in actuality, regardless of how imperfectly it was perceived 
beforehand. Sustaining fiscal illusion requires that 
decisive voters not recognize this true cost even when it is 
paid. 14 Initiating fiscal illusion requires that they not 
anticipate these consequences. The ability of voters to 
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learn from experience can be expected to place limits on the 
ability to sustain a significant misallocation burden 
attributable to fiscal illusion, and the anticipation of the 
consequences will place some limits on the ability to impose 
even one-time burdens. 
The greater the illusion, as illustrated by the further 
outward movement of the opportunity locus in Figure 3-8, the 




14In line with the threshold possibilities suggested by 
Oates, it is possible that if they pay only a small portion 
of the cost, individuals will not perceive this difference 
between the true and the perceived cost. 
Oates further suggests that the difficulties inherent 
in the measurement of units of the public good, discussed 
earlier, here give rise to the further possibility that 
misperception of the number of units provided may offset the 
misperception of price. While possible, there is no 
particular reason to believe that these misperceptions would 
offset, rather than reinforce, each other -- that quantity 
would be overestimated while cost is underestimated. 
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the extreme case, if illusion were so great as to give the 
dashed curve as a perceived opportunity locus, the resulting 
** • . G1 would be beyond the soc1ety•s capac1ty to produce, even 
with a commitment of all resources to the public sector. 
Consequences of illusion this great seem not only 
recognizable after the fact but also foreseeable. Though 
lesser degrees of illusion may be more readily sustainable, 
the fact that they generate non-optimal allocations when 
they are implemented will be a source of the incentive and 
the power to eliminate them. 
The damage that is done by illusion-determined choices 
. .. **> is measured by the d1fference between u1 (G) and u1 (G , 
which lies below it on the indifference map, as shown in 
Figure 3-9a. It is also manifested in the median voter 




U i ( G j •• )t-----:o:--1--1--1 
'Ill 
ui (G1 ) . - .. 
\ U
1


















" .. .. 
the decisive voter acting under illusion is the difference 
~n the height of the actual, solid Uj(G} at its actual 
maximum at G* and at its lower height when G is increased 
In both cases, the greater the illusion, the greater 
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the distance, i.e., the greater the cost of the illusion in 
terms of forgone satisfaction. Since it is this damage that 
provides the opportunity and the incentive to dispel 
illusion, the greater it is, the more potent the seed of its 
own destruction that it carries within itself. The benefit 
to individual j of dispelling his illusion is commensurate 
with this damage. The potential exists for any agent 
capable of dispelling it to reap a part of that benefit for 
himself in a transaction that is mutually beneficial to both 
himself and individual j. 
Who that agent may be and how he can internalize that 
benefit will be explored more fully in the next chapter. It 
has already been suggested that the individual voter who 
suspects that he may be under illusion may himself be able 
to learn the extent of this damage by experience or to 
foresee it; in these cases he may be an effective agent for 
dispelling his own illusion. He may become that rare 
individual that appeared to Downs an aberration, whose 
nonconformity with the expected high degree of rational 
ignorance was not well explained within his model. One 
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voters find it in their own self-interest to become well-
informed. As Downs perceived, these conditions are not 
commonly met, but they may be, and this case can be 
significant for the public choice outcome. As also explored 
in the next chapter, perhaps the most likely agent to be 
able to reap the benefit of dispelling illusion is the 
politician seeking the rewards of office. Other possible 
agents include private sellers of information, the press, 
and non-decisive voters who will also benefit from a lower 
level of G because of the nature of their own preferences. 
Any or all of these agents may dispel illusion, and 
competition among them may allot various roles in the 
process to each, depending upon their cost and effectiveness 
and upon the institutional framework. 
One aspect of the situation that such an agent can 
perceive is that, because of the nature of the median voter 
mechanism for aggregating individual choices, eliminating 
the impact of illusion upon the outcome does not require 
that he counteract illusion in everyone, but only in the 
decisive voters. 15 What is needed is not information per 
§g; what is needed is an outcome that is not distorted by 
illusion. Indeed, because information is costly, it would 
15voters themselves may choose to leave suspected 
illusions unexamined because they know that their knowing 
will have no impact upon the ultimate decision or because 
they accurately perceive that the outcome will suit them 
reasonably well. 
' ' 
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be a waste for all voters to be well-informed -- not just a 
private waste, but a social waste as well. A social 
mechanism that does not economize on information costs 
cannot be efficient. Unlike the private market where each 
individual determines his own level of a good and (as Downs 
has stressed) has the incentive to know, in the 
determination of G, not every individual is decisive, and 
those who are not have less need to know. The fact that 
they also have less incentive to know is not necessarily a 
problem. Significant amounts of the concern over political 
ignorance and apathy may be because we do not fully 
appreciate the mechanisms that are at work to limit the 
impact of fiscal illusion. The next chapter examines those 
mechanisms. 
Although cast in the framework of illusion with respect 
to the cost or benefits of the provision of public goods and 
services, with the level of those goods and services subject 
to a median voter model of collective choice, the discussion 
in this chapter can be generalized to any issue that 
generates single-peaked preferences in a median voter 
analysis. Thus, more broadly conceived, it will serve the 
more general discussion of limits on fiscal illusion in 
Chapter Four. 
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IV. Illusion Thresholds 
While the foregoing analysis provides a good working 
model, one aspect of it bears further exploration. Although 
it is clear that the opportunity locus that embodies 
illusion will lie to the right and above the actual 
opportunity locus, the precise nature and extent of the 
impact of illusion are less easy to specify. One 
interesting possibility is suggested by Oates (1988b, 68). 
In his view there may be threshold effects that allow 
illusion to persist over a certain range of values of the 
illusion variables but eliminate it at higher levels as its 
effects become manifested more clearly; or, more generally, 
the effect of illusion may vary in magnitude with budgetary 
levels. The effect of this hypothesis upon the misperceived 
opportunity locus of Figure 3-3 is to reduce its outward 
displacement at higher levels of G. Such a reduction could, 
if the awareness is changed radically or suddenly enough, 
result in a kinked or even a convex form for the opportunity 
locus, with the possibility of associated complications of 
the tangency condition. A kinked perceived opportunity 
locus would not affect the uniqueness of the tangency 
condition for the individual: in the case of convexity, 
multiple tangencies or paradoxical outcomes are possible, 
with the exact results depending upon the particular shapes 
and locations of the opportunity locus and the indifference 
curves. 
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When we broaden the picture to include many voters, the 
case of the kinked perceived opportunity locus opens some 
interesting possibilities. Figure 3-10 illustrates this 
situation. The kink implies that people with a variety of 
tastes and preferences but with the same perceived 
possibilities curve will tend to cluster at one perceived 
optimal level of G, G, with fewer finding their optima at 
outlying levels of G. Tangency will occur at the kink for 





slopes, as illustrated in curves a, b, and c, shown in 
G 
Figure 3-lOa. Further, since the perceived locus is flatter 
than the actual locus for G < G, as in the previous case, 
* ** individuals with Gj < G will have Gj closer to G than they 
would in the absence of illusion, as illustrated for 
individual g in Figure 3-lOb. Individuals with Gj* > G, as 






steeper perceived opportunity locus and reach their optimum 
with a higher level of G than in the absence of illusion, 
but lower than if the threshold effects had not been 
introduced. For the individual, this result is not 
surprising; it is merely a more abstract and formal way of 
looking at the fact that limits to the misperception of 
fiscal variables will limit the distorting effects of 
illusion upon fiscal choices of the individual. That this 
result generates a greater consensus on the optimal level of 
G is an outcome that is less obvious. 
Placed in the setting of the median voter model, the 
possibility of a kinked perceived opportunity locus proves 
interesting. If a number of individuals have differing 
tastes and preferences, as revealed in different slopes of 
their indifference curves, but identical (mis)perceived 
opportunity locuses, the result may be a consensus on the 
desired level of G that, within the median voter context, 
. . ** would g1ve a c1uster1ng of Gj values that could affect the 
political outcome and could make that outcome stable. This 
consensus effect may make it more likely that some agent 
could enlighten this group of individuals, dispelling the 
illusion and altering the outcome. 
While this is an interesting possibility, it is 
somewhat restricted by the assumption of uniformity in the 
perceived transformation curves. One way to ease that 
restriction.is to include curves of individuals whose 
I ,, 
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incomes and associated Xj intercepts differ but for whom the 
kink still occurs at the same level of G. This seems a 
realistic possibility if the location of the kink is 
determined by the visibility of G in the community or is 
triggered by certain levels of expenditure. This change 
does not alter the preceding results or the general 
appearance of Figure 3-107 it merely adds more voters' uj 
curves to the graph and increases the scope of the 
consensus. Another way to ease the restriction is to allow 
for groups of citizens with common budget lines (or sets of 
~ 
budget lines with a common value of G). This situation 
would result in groups of clustered voters, with similar 
effects upon the stability of the political outcome and the 
possibilities for dispelling the illusion. 
This exploration of threshold effects anticipates the 
further development of the issue of awareness later in this 
analysis. There it is viewed within a general context of 
economic costs and benefits of sustaining illusion that 
suggests a more gradual boundary between illusion and 
accurate perception, a slow dawning of awareness rather than 
a sudden awakening. That analysis allows greater scope for 
individual variations in all the factors that underlie the 
particulars of the curves that generate the perceived 
desired level of G for different individuals. While that 
approach would suggest that kinks are unlikely, it would 
still involve an increase in the curvature of the perceived 
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opportunity locus and result in some degree of the 
clustering found here. 
v. Benefit Illusion 
Fiscal illusion includes misperception of the benefits 
of public goods and services as well as their cost. West 
and Winer have incorporated both into their model, stressing 
the need to view the level of cost illusion together with 
the level of benefit illusion in order to evaluate the net 
impact of fiscal illusion, since the two may partially or 
completely offset each other. Mill and McCulloch also 
focused on the relationship between these two categories of 
illusion, arguing that it was desirable to create an 
illusion of lower cost in order to counteract a naturally-
occurring benefit illusion caused by a tendency to 
underestimate the benefits of public goods. 16 The analysis 
of benefit illusion reveals interesting parallels and 
divergences from the preceding analysis of cost illusion. 
Though underestimation of the benefits of public goods 
and services is certainly conceivable, and was the focus of 
Galbraith and his followers, as well as of Mill and 
McCulloch, the case that has dominated the literature 
assumes that the benefits of public goods and services are 
overestimated relative to those of private goods and 
1~est and Winer {1980, 607) alone seem to have noted 
their contribution to this field. 
services. Figure 3-1, which illustrates the individual's 
choice between public and private goods when fiscal 
decisions are made in the absence of illusion, once again 
56 
serves as a point of reference for discussing the effects of 
illusion. In the case of benefit illusion it is the utility 
function that associates different levels of the publicly 
provided good with the levels of utility of the consumers of 
those goods that may embody illusion. To illustrate its 
effects, the indifference curves may be rotated downward 
from their vertical intercepts, as depicted by the dotted 
curves in Figure 3-11. 17 The indifference curves will pivot 
xj 
~------------~~~~~--~~ 
FIGURE 3-11 G 
inward, indicating that the individual is willing to accept 
fewer units of G as compensation for any given reduction in 
17Inclusion of the vertical intercept's allows a clearer 
presentation of the relative levels of utility that are 
important to the conclusions drawn from this analysis. 
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X when he is subject to the illusion that the benefits of G 
are greater than they are in reality. 18 At any given point 
in the commodity space, the indifference curve passing 
through that point will be steeper than it was in the 
absence of illusion. 
When the transformation frontier is superimposed on the new 
indifference curves, tangency will occur to the right of the 
non-illusion tangency because of the steeper slope of the 
indifference curves. We can again consider the effects of 
the illusion: 
1) The individual sees himself as able to 
achieve a higher level of utility than 
he is able to achieve in reality. This 
** provides his incentive to opt for G1 , 
0 ** tl* ** * . s1nce u1 (G1 ) > u1 (G1 ), as seen 1n the 
dotted indifference curves. Furthermore, 
1~his can be a puzzling matter. Though it sounds 
almost as if he is happier, easier to please, it is because 
he thinks there are benefits that are not reallv there. For 
example, he may believe that schools are providing valuable 
skills and experiences that will enrich the lives of the 
students and make them more productive, when in fact they 
fail to generate these outcomes; or he may feel that 
increased jail capacities make his neighborhood safer than 
they in fact do. He feels safe when he is not. He 
mistakenly perceives the level of satisfaction that would 
result if the public goods and services really gave more 
benefits. 
How to evaluate the individual's subjective valuation 
is a matter that is open to question. This element could 
complicate the comparison of the levels of u1• For this analysis the illusions are considered to provide a lower 
level of satisfaction than the real thing. 
for any given level of G except o, the 
associated u1(G) perceived as 
. 1 ** . 19 atta1nab e, u1 (G1), r1ses. 
2) The optimizing level of G increases, 
• • •• under 1llus1on, to G1 • 
3) The optimizing level of X must fall to 
** xi • 
Only in the third effect, not explicit in the median voter 
diagram, do we find a difference from the results in the 
cost illusion case. In this case, cost is perceived 
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** ** accurately, and Xi must decrease with the increase in Gi • 
Once again the first two effects are manifested 
directly in the Uj(G) curve of the median voter diagram, and 
in exactly the same way, so that Figure 3-4 depicts this 
case of benefit illusion as well as that of cost illusion. 
As before, the individual perceives a higher level of 
satisfaction with Gt'' than with Gt. Once again, however, 
the curves that depict reality reveal a reduction in 
satisfaction in the illusion situation. While the 
individual is not directly confronted by the contradiction 
inherent in the cost illusion, the level of satisfaction 
that he actually attains is lower than he expected it to be 
19This can be seen the fact that any given combination 
of X and G that is on the frontier generates unchanged 
satisfaction from the X but enhanced perceived satisfaction 
from the G. 
and lower than would be possible in the absence of 
illusion. 13 He would in reality prefer more private goods. 
As before, the impact of this discrepancy upon political 
outcomes will depend upon the method of aggregating 
individual preferences. Again, some recognition of the 
underlying reality may come directly from the feedback of 
this contradiction between expectations and reality, or it 
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may come from some source with the potential to derive some 
gain from eliminating the illusion. It is to this latter 
concern that we now turn. 
13Perhaps this, with a twist, is part of what happened 
with the Great society programs of LBJ. A gradual 
disillusionment with the programs that set out to eradicate 
the problems of poverty and ignorance dawned upon the nation 
as the anticipated benefits did not materialize. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LIMITATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FISCAL ILLUSION 
Chapter Two argued for a broad definition of fiscal 
illusion that encompasses all situations in which one or 
more individuals misperceive one or more fiscal parameters. 
At the same time it recognized that one special case has 
been the source of particular concern and has motivated a 
large part of the research into the subject. The concern is 
that because citizens perceive fiscal parameters 
imperfectly, public officials can manipulate their 
' 
perceptions to the citizens' detriment and to the 
politicians/bureaucrats' benefit. In the usual scenario, 
this involves an increase1 in the size of government 
expenditures, from which the politician gains some (usually 
unspecified) benefit and the citizens incur a loss. 
1The increase must be defined relative to some 
standard. Clotfelter attributes the standard of perfect 
perception of costs to Wagner (1976) and Buchanan (1967). 
Optimal perception of costs seems a more appropriate 
standard because it allows knowledge to be treated as a 
variable, whose level can be adjusted in accordance with 
costs and benefits. This standard does become difficult to 
handle, however, because the benefits of increased knowledge 
to the individual and to society may,diverge, as may the 
costs of acquiring that knowledge, and because the 
relationship between the individual and the social benefits 




In assessing this concern, a careful examination of the 
existing limitations on the capacity of public officials to 
manipulate citizens' perceptions to the citizens' detriment 
is warranted, including a reexamination of the politician's 
role. Downs's exposition of how the attenuation of a 
voter's incentives to acquire knowledge leaves him more 
vulnerable to manipulation in the political sphere than in 
the market, while valuable, has dominated the analysis of 
fiscal illusion to the exclusion of other important 
considerations. 
This exploration of the limits on fiscal illusion 
begins with the primary agent, the politician in a median-
voter setting, and the possibility that he may better 
achieve his own ends by dealing with fiscal illusion on the 
part of voters in a way that is both efficient and socially 
optimal. It then turns to other important, related factors 
that limit that vulnerability of the political decision-
making process to distortions induced by fiscal illusion. 
Several factors on the "demand" (that is, roughly, the 
citizens') side, are examined; then, beyond the politician's 
role within the median voter setting, additional limiting 
factors on the "supply" (roughly, the public officials') 
side are examined. 
I. The Politician's Role in Dispelling Illusion 
Among the factors that may place limits upon the impact 
--~---- ------
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of fiscal illusion are the incentives of politicians. It is 
possible that these agents operating within the institutions 
of public choice may reap private gain by limiting the 
impact of fiscal illusion upon the-political outcome rather 
than by promulgating illusion. Their impact may be compared 
to that of the arbitrageurs who, in the Mishkin analysis, 
reap private gain by mitigating the impact of individuals' 
irrationality upon the achievement of efficient outcomes in 
financial markets. Indeed, it is not the financial markets 
alone that offer a paradigm for the aggregation of differing 
evaluations of benefits and costs in a way that efficiently 
deals with problems of misperception: markets for ordinary 
goods and services also offer instructive parallels in this 
regard. 
Differences in Valuations in a Market setting 
and in a Public Choice Setting 
We begin with an examination of the phenomenon of 
differing evaluations of costs and benefits among the 
individual participants in private markets and of how those 
differences play themselves out in that institutional 
setting: we then consider how differing evaluations are 
dealt with in a public choice setting. This discussion will 
provide the foundation for the analysis of the mechanisms 
and agents that are important when illusion is a source of 
those differences in individual valuations both of private 
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goods and of public goods. 
What a market for a good or service does is to effect 
trades whenever differing evaluations of a product offer the 
possibility of a Pareto improvement, embodied in a voluntary 
trade. In Figure 4-1 the market demand curve embodies the 
marginal evaluations of successive units by individual 
consumers, registering the benefits final users derive from 
consuming the good. They are ranked in decreasing order. 
The market supply curve shows marginal costs, measured in 
dollars, of successive units. These marginal costs are also 
individual evaluations of the good, this time in terms of 
the sacrifices entailed in making 
p 
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FIGURE 4-1 
the good available; implicitly they represent an evaluation 
of the benefits of the alternative uses of the resources 
devoted to making the good available. These marginal 
evaluations of providers are ranked in increasing order. we 
may note here that these valuations can incorporate 
illusion, 2 a point we want to return to later. In the 
market, individuals who, in effect, trade, do not directly 
compare the subjective evaluations of the buyer and the 
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seller of some particular unit. Unlike a barter mechanism, 
the market mechanism does not require that they seek out a 
disparity in valuations that offers a wedge of net gain that 
can be shared in order to provide motivation for the 
individuals to consummate the trade. Rather, the terms of 
trade are established impersonally in the equilibrium price, 
which equates the quantity supplied with the quantity 
demanded in a Walrasian way, with bids to buy and offers to 
sell ultimately determined by Marshallian marginal 
evaluations, but without a direct comparison of those 
evaluations. For each individual producer and consumer, 
that readily observable equilibrium price provides the 
information and the incentive to take advantage of the 
underlying differing evaluations to maximize his own 
wellbeing. In doing so, each pursues his own independently 
determined course of action. 3 The end result is that no 
unexploited differences in evaluations remain. 
2This may even be as a result of deliberate fraud, in a 
special case, but its significance is independent of the 
source or its intent. 
3Transaction costs affect the individual's 
participation in the market and may prevent some trades that 
would be beneficial in the absence of transaction costs. 
Trades of this nature occur differently in a market 
with arbitrage. 4 Here there is an agent, the arbitrageur, 
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who consummates trades by buying from individuals with lower 
valuations and selling to those with higher valuations until 
no unexploited differences are left. 5 The arbitrageur has a 
role to play when individual transaction costs, including 
information costs, are great. It is part of his role to 
make up for the limited information of the participants. It 
is worth noting that he does so not by providing the 
individuals with all the information needed to enable them 
to effect the transaction themselves; rather, he need only 
present to the individual with a non-marginal valuation a 
"deal" that individual can judge as better for himself. In 
deciding this, all of the individual's own directly known or 
easily accessible (and thus cheap) information is brought to 
bear as he compares his own valuation with the dollar price 
offered by the arbitrageur. The buyer's decision-making 
process is the same as that of the individual purchaser of a 
good or service in a normal product market. The outcome of 
no unexploited differences in evaluations is the same. Only 
the mechanism by which that outcome is achieved differs, and 
this difference will be important to us later. 
~arkets with brokers that reduce information and 
transactions costs for the transacting individuals are also 
amenable to this analysis. 
5Again, the transaction costs of arbitrage may qualify 
this result. 
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Differences in valuations also occur in a public choice 
setting. Individuals differ in their subjective evaluations 
of the costs and the benefits of public goods, and these 
differences could again be depicted in a graph like Figure 
4-l. In the case of a public good, however, there is no 
parallel to a market without arbitrage because the 
individual is not able to act independently on public goods. 
There is no price established by competitive bidding upon 
which he can base his quantity decision, acting as an 
independent agent with only his own self-interest at stake 
in the decision. Since the very nature of public goods is 
that they are non-excludable and non-rival, a collective 
choice must take place. The individual's method of 
implementing his valuation of the public good then is 
different, and there is a different mechanism for 
aggregating individual preferences. 
Chapter Three showed the determination of the 
individual's preferred level of public goods within the 
established consumer choice model. Based upon the costs and 
benefits of the public good, as he perceives them, he takes 
independent, self-interested action to implement his 
preferences about publicly provided goods and services. In 
this, there is a common element in the two choice 
mechanisms. The action by which he implements his valuation 
in the public goods sector differs, however. In the median 
L 
67 
voter model, the individual considers the options open to 
him and chooses how to vote (or not vote), based upon which 
option will result in a level of provision of public goods 
that maximizes the utility he will attain. 
When we consider the mechanism by which the various 
individual valuations are combined in this model, a parallel 
with the arbitraged market emerges, in which the politician 
plays a role like that of the arbitrageur. It is up to him 
to judge the voters' valuations and to offer them a "deal" 
that they can recognize as better for them. The "deal" that 
is to his advantage to offer is the median of the most-
preferred outcomes (MMPO). It will give him the majority 
vote and the consequent claim to the rewards.of office, 
whatever those rewards may be. Just as the market generates 
or the successful arbitrageur hones in on the market-
clearing price for the marginal unit and promotes the 
attainment of the "achieve-all-trades-with-MU-of-buyerii! 
marginal-cost-of-seller" outcome, the politician promotes 
the MMPO outcome. 6 The politician who wins is the one who 
most accurately evaluates this median value. In a world of 
perfect knowledge on the part of voters, that is the essence 
of the story. In attempting to win by associating himself 
6It is important to note that we cannot say that the 
median-voter outcome is optimal in the sense that the market 
outcome is. The most that we will be able to claim for the 
politician's successful role is that it leaves the median-
voter outcome unaffected by any illusion that generates 
damages greater than the cost of dispelling that illusion. 
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with the MMPO, the politician may find it useful to use 
surveys, polls, and other formal or informal means of 
ascertaining the MMPO more accurately, as long as their cost 
is justified by the increase in accuracy they permit. 
Politicians who do not play this role efficiently are 
eliminated by the voting process. 
Both the market and the voting mechanisms aggregate 
individual evaluations to arrive at an outcome that reflects 
the underlying individual evaluations of costs and of 
benefits. 7 Neither choice mechanism <market or political) 
eliminates the differing evaluations. Arbitrageur and 
politician alike offer individuals a transaction that 
reconciles those differing individual evaluations. Like the 
arbitrageur, the politician need not change the individual 
evaluations; he needs instead to offer the median of the 
most-preferred outcomes that takes those evaluations into 
account. Fiscal illusion resides in those evaluations, but 
does not exhaust them. It is to this component of 
subjective evaluations -- to illusion -- that we now turn 
our attention. 
7The market mechanism brings evaluations of costs and 
benefits directly to bear on each unit; in the voting 
mechanism those evaluations are combined into a judgment 
about the level of public goods provision that will maximize 
the individual's utility. 
L 
69 
Illusion as a Component of Subjective Evaluations: 
The crucial Role of the Aggregating Mechanism 
In the determination of the amount of a public good, 
just as with a private good, the consumer's perception of 
the benefit to himself may or may not be accurate, and it 
may differ from the perceived benefit of other voters. 
Differences in perceived benefit may arise from differences 
in subjective assessments of the utility provided by the 
good as well as from differences in perceiving the actual 
nature of the good. The latter may involve fiscal illusion, 
but the former does not. It is the latter that the 
literature of fiscal illusion addresses; there it is 
isolated as the sole focus of the analysis of fiscal 
illusion. This analysis attempts to achieve a fuller 
understanding of the impact of differences in perception 
that are grounded in fiscal illusion by placing them in the 
more general context of how disparate valuations of all 
sorts are aggregated by different mechanismse 
The perceived cost of the public good also may or may 
not be accurate. As fully recognized throughout the 
literature of fiscal illusion, an indicator of the relevant 
cost information is not as readily available to the 
individual as the market price of a private good, which 
communicates to him the marginal cost of the last unit 
produced. Though this is not the marginal cost of the unit 
he may actually consume, since units are fungible, this 
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difference is not important for the equilibrium allocation 
or for his utility-maximizing choice. 8 Still, individuals 
may not perceive the cost of a private good accurately, and 
their inaccuracies be the source of differences in the 
perceived cost among different participants in the market. 
In the case of public goods, while the actual cost function 
embodies a non-subjective evaluation, based on resources 
used and their prices, individual perceptions of it may 
differ because of this sort of misperception: fiscal 
illusion may also be a component of the perception of cost. 
When the market is the aggregating mechanism, the 
marginal valuations conform to established relationships, 
MU = P = MC, or 
MRSxy = Px/Py = MRTxy' 
that result in optimal balancing of supply and demand forces 
and effect the optimal level of mutually beneficial trades. 
These relationships are not affected by the differing 
valuations of non-marginal participants in the market, 
"illusory" or not. Unless misperception affects the 
marginal uses or production, the individual alone sustains 
any loss of satisfaction from its impact. It is only in the 
case and to the extent that it affects the market price that 
anyone else gets hurt (or helped) by it; only then is there 
8since the marginal costs of the inframarginal units 
are important for the level of wellbeing for the provider 
who is involved in the market trade, their influence is 
still brought to bear upon the outcome. 
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a social concern that goes beyond the private concern. 
Thus, most illusion is immaterial to the market outcome and 
the efficient allocation of resources. 
Figure 4-2 depicts this situation for the case in which 
the individual is subject to a positive benefit illusion. 
The individual consumer buys whenever 
S/unit 
subjective evaluation + illusion ~ price 
(pos or neg) 
p " 





Note that though he is subject to illusion concerning all 
the units purchased, most of the purchase decisions (the m 
units shown in Figure 4-2a) remained unchanged by the 
presence of illusion. The level of satisfaction that he 
attains will not be as great as that which was anticipated 
because of the illusion. This disparity presumably does 
dispel the illusion as he consumes the good and gains 
Q 
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firsthand experience of it. For most units, where marginal 
consumer surplus is normally positive, only a loss in 
anticipated consumer surplus results from illusion. 
As shown in Figure 4-2b, the benefit illusion involved 
in the purchase of unit ~ affects only the buyer of that 
unit. In contrast, benefit illusion that gives rise to the 
purchase of the marginal units labeled ~ may have external 
effects: it may raise the price, albeit by an almost 
imperceptibly small amount. Aggregated over all the buyers 
and sellers, it redistributes consumer surplus to the 
recipients of profit in what may be a substantial amount 
because of the number of units involved. Nevertheless, the 
effect upon the allocation of resources to the production of 
this product is small, resulting in only ~ additional units 
of output. Viewed in the context of the whole market, we 
see a very small impact of this consumer's illusion on the 
market price, since he is such a small part of that market; 
in contrast, the relatively large impact upon his own 
wellbeing gives him an incentive to eliminate his marginal 
illusion, whenever the cost of doing so is less than the 
loss in satisfaction he incurs as a result of the illusion. 9 
9For cost illusion, a similar diagram for producers 
would show a small impact on the market price but a large 
impact upon the individual producer and his level of profit, 
giving him an incentive to eliminate his marginal illusion. 
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This result, that illusion matters to the market 
determination of the level of output of the good or service 
if and only if the participant with marginal valuation has 
that valuation because of illusion, neatly parallels the 
median-voter situation analyzed in Chapter Three. In the 
political realm, illusion may again be a component of the 
voters' evaluations of costs and benefits. The voting 
mechanism aggregates those subjective, individual 
evaluations with a similar outcome: only marginal illusion 
matters to the level of provision of the public good or 
service. 
Since in the arbitraged market and in the political 
mechanism, special agents function to arrive at outcomes 
that reflect the differing evaluations of individuals, it is 
appropriate to ask whether those agents' decisions would be 
less likely to be affected by illusion than those of other 
participants in the market. In a product or financial 
market the arbitrageur will bear the losses generated by the 
errors that such illusion fosters. Arbitrageurs are subject 
to competitive market forces. Those who provide bad 
information, who promote greater illusion, are eliminated 
from the market, partially by their clients' ability to 
foresee and evaluate for themselves the falsehood of their 
claims, but even more by the ability of other arbitrageurs 
to offer a better deal and to provide whatever information 
will allow clients to recognize that better deal. The 
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arbitrageur's profit is the economic incentive for him to 
engage in this activity and to pursue it until its marginal 
return equals the marginal sacrifice that providing it 
entails. 
How does illusion on the part of voters affect the 
politician subject to competition from other politicians? 
At first glance, it may appear that illusion need not help 
or hinder him, for if he can estimate it accurately, he can 
still win by associating himself with the illusion-
incorporating MMPO level of public goods, and he will win as 
long as the illusion lasts. There seems to be no particular 
incentive either to create or to dispel illusion as long as 
he can accurately estimate it. There is, however, a 
potential area of vulnerability in this position. It was 
demonstrated in Chapter Three that if illusion distorts the 
outcome, it will have a damaging effect on the individual 
voters' wellbeing. This reduction in individual ophelemity 
will alter the perception of the costs and benefits of the 
public good and the corresponding MMPO. If the politician 
fails to adjust to those changing percep~ions of the voters, 
and to persuade the marginal voters that he has made that 
adjustment, he may lose his majority and with it the rewards 
of office. It is here that we see an additional endogenous 
source of changing voter perceptions: competing 
politicians. Their impact makes the damaging effec~ on 
individual wellbeing important beyond the possibility of the 
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individual's independent recognition or anticipation of that 
loss. That loss from illusion-influenced choices is a 
wedge, analogous to arbitrage potential, which the competing 
politician can use to his own private gain. 
How can the politician use this wedge to benefit from 
dispelling illusion? One way is to provide information that 
allows voters to dispel their illusion. By doing so, he may 
advocate a MMPO that truly maximizes voter wellbeing, 
thereby garnering votes that will stay with him. If he 
fails to dispel illusion, a competitor can do so and achieve 
a more stable consensus on the MMPO. 
In taking this course, the politician's role is much 
like that of the market's arbitrageur. In the political 
realm, he is the primary agent for eliminating marginal 
illusion and its impact upon the collectively determined 
outcome. His concern is with those whose illusion has an 
impact on the MMPO: he needs to provide information only 
when it is marginal, when it has an impact upon the outcome. 
His incentive to do so is that he may more reliably receive 
the majority vote and the consequent rewards of office. 10 
10Individually, given a perception of costs, 
politicians have the incentive to increase perceived benefit 
to their own ends. One might argue that politicians may 
just compete against each other to see who can create the 
greatest illusion, rather than dispelling it. The 
politician will indeed do whichever benefits him the most, 
but he is subject to the limits placed upon him by 
competition. Reality is a crucial anchor in that 
competition. To the extent that the politician truly 
provides greater benefits, he can attract more voters, but 
the ability to increase perceived benefits through illusion 
Once this principle for maximizing true wellbeing of 
the voters is established, on the basis that it has a more 
reliable appeal that cannot be eliminated by a rival 
politician, it follows rather easily that the politician 
will have the incentive to dispel illusion efficiently, in 
terms of the resources and methods he uses to do this, in 
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terms of targeting the voters whose illusion matters, and in 
terms of extending such activities until the marginal return 
in increased voter wellbeing equals the marginal cost of 
dispelling illusion. 11 
It is crucial to recognize that though the voter 
himself may not seek out the information because of Downsian 
factors, the politician subject to the competition of other 
actual and potential politicians is the wellspring of the 
gathered-up incentive. 12 His whole set of rewards rides 
is limited by his competitors' ability to gain by dispelling 
those illusions. 
11 President carter, in a televised conversation with 
Bill Moyers, recounted an example concerning an important 
piece of trade legislation. Among other measures in support 
of it, he sent his workers out to the garden club meetings 
in the cities in a crucial senator's state to influence, by 
informing and persuading, just such a vote with a high 
marginal impact. Even at a national level, these forces so 
abstractly described were at work: this president really 
was expending resources to dispel ignorance/illusion in 
voters with a marginal impact that was likely to be 
decisive. 
12Do competitive "market" forces affect the delivery of 
politicians' services? some suggest that barriers to entry 
may limit the effectiveness of competition. Certainly 
information and training barriers to entry for financial 
arbitrageurs must be very high, too, yet competition in 
arbitrageurs' services is certainly effective. Part IV of 
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upon his swinging the marginal votes. 
There remains some concern that the politician might 
want to promote illusion that would move voters closer to 
his view. We might first ask why he would choose that 
option. If he does, it is in his dual role as an ordinary 
citizen-voter rather than in the role of the politician; an 
assumption that he has ends other than the rewards of office 
needs to be made. In this case, if it is cheaper to promote 
illusion than to dispel it, illusion might win out, 
particularly in the short run, where the damages are not 
made evident by the disparity between the outcome and the 
expectation of the voter. While it may require more 
information to provide a proposal based on the maximization 
of actual satisfaction, there being one r.ight level and an 
infinity of possible wrong ones, it would seem as a matter 
of chance easier to hit on a wrong one. But this is not to 
say that one would foster it by illusion-creation. The case 
for that action is not clearly drawn. It may appear that in 
the short run one can fabricate an illusion out of thin air, 
while dispelling it takes support -- data, information, 
voter attention. On the other hand, counter-assertions 
might be equally easily fabricated and equally effective. A 
past reputation for reliability and accuracy, can give an 
edge to valid counterassertion. Indeed, one may propose 
this chapter explores this concern further. 
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based on truth first, and not let opponents get primacy. 
Another intriguing possibility is that of fraud. Darby 
and Karni {1973) have discussed the "optimal amount of 
fraud" in the context of product and service markets, 
stressing the importance of what they call "credence 
qualities" in markets where information requirements are 
large and complex, and the information is not directly 
accessible to the consumer. When the public official 
generates fiscal illusions by design in order to promote his 
own wellbeing, the issue is really one of fraud, and it is 
reasonable to ask why a politician would engage in this 
indirect sort of fraud, when he can defraud the public by 
more direct means. One answer is that the latter course may 
have some probability of incurring legal retribution, and 
that it may result in public ignominy. Still, at some level 
of reward, these consequences may be willingly incurred. 
creation of fiscal illusion may be seen as lying within a 
spectrum of fraudulent practices that politicians may engage 
in. A second possibility is that the politician may share 
the illusion that he promulgates, unlike the defrauder, 
misleading the public without the intention of doing so. 
The damage done is the same in both those cases. 
The important point in the Darby and Karni analysis is 
that in the case of fraud, the optimal amount of fraud is 
not no fraud at all but rather the amount that balances the 
marginal damage resulting from fraud against the marginal 
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cost of eliminating that fraud. 
While the politician's role is foremost among the 
factors that place limitations on the economic impact of 
fiscal illusion, there is a whole array of additional 
factors that influence citizens and public officials, 
distinctly underplayed in the existing literature, that work 
to circumscribe the damage wrought by fiscal illusion. 
II. "Demand" Factors 
1) Even with a limited incentive to obtain information 
that is costly, the contradiction between the illusion-
generated expectations and the possibilities offered by the 
real world was seen in Chapter Three to suggest that the 
voter might directly perceive the negative impact of fiscal 
illusion upon his wellbeing after the fact, preventing 
illusion from being maintained, or even anticipated by the 
voter. 
Instances of these forces at play are readily gleaned 
from coverage of governmental issues in any area of the 
country. Voters in North Arlington could recognize more or 
less readily that the benefits of a proposed regional park 
there, or a national War on Poverty program, or a flood 
control project on marginal land in Arlandria would not 
provide the promised level of benefits. Citizens of 
Baltimore were justifiably skeptical about early cost 
estimates for twin downtown stadiums; sheltering the 
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homeless in D.C. clearly required more resources than stated 
in early proposals to fund that program; many Fairfax County 
citizens saw early on that the proposed merit pay program 
for teachers would necessitate reductions in the provision 
of other county services, a sacrifice some were unwilling to 
make. 
Since this sort of direct perception is a relatively 
"low cost" source of information, particularly when the 
illusion has a large effect upon the perceived optimal 
allocation and is therefore most important, 13 it may place 
an important limit upon the extent of illusion. 
2) Though the citizen's incentives to obtain 
information and to use that information in voting seem 
limited by the small average impact of his vote, many other 
factors also impinge upon his judgment about the degree of 
information necessary for his vote to serve his own best 
interest. 
Chapter Three expounded the importance of the 
collective choice mechanism in determining the impact of the 
individual's fiscal illusion upon the fiscal outcome. The 
effect of his illusion depends upon a) how much impact it 
13This awareness -- that is directly perceived by the 
voter and grows as the magnitude of the impact of illusion 
upon budgetary size grows -- is related to the concerns in 
Oates's discussion of threshold effects. As discussed 
earlier, one approach to this limiting force is to embody it 
directly in the voter's perceived opportunity locus. 
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has on his level of wellbeing and b) how his decision is 
weighted by the collective choice mechanism. What he judges 
is the amount of information needed for him to cast his 
vote. He may need very little to know that he lies far to 
the right of the G~ and the implication of that position 
for his vote on a particular issue. Even sustaining a high 
level of fiscal illusion may not alter the relationship 
between his vote and the median vote or the outcome. 
Certainly this is readily apparent for the taxpayer who 
has three children in the public schools and plans to retire 
to Florida when they leave home: he will best serve his own 
interest by voting in favor of tax increases to lower the 
pupil/teacher ration even if he suspects that the cost will 
be far more than expected and the level of benefits far 
lower than purported, and more information will not help him 
cast a more satisfactory vote. Illusion maintained under 
these circumstances is optimal; use of resources in becoming 
better informed would be wasteful. 
In other circumstances, however, the voter may indeed 
feel that a well-informed vote best serves his own interest. 
If his preferences are such that his optimal level of G is 
close to the median preference -- the very instance in which 
his illusion may matter most -- he may well perceive the 
possibility that he, himself, could be the decisive voter 
and that his illusion could be decisive for the outcome. In 
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this case the full weight of the illusion loss in utility14 
is balanced against his cost of acquiring information, of 
dispelling his illusion. As also discussed in Chapter 
Three, the greater the divergence of the political choices 
caused by the illusion, the greater the reward to him of a 
"correct" decisive vote, and the greater the corresponding 
incentive to acquire accurate information. 
It is certainly not far-fetched to envision a citizen, 
perhaps oneself, seeing a close election that will determine 
the master plan for county roads over the next decade and 
planning to vote because he may make a difference, quite 
possibly reading the paper during the week before the 
election to find out more about the costs and the benefits 
and perhaps chatting with h~s neighbors about the issue. 15 
Further, though there is, after the fact, only a single 
decisive voter, with a very small likelihood of being any 
one particular individual, the ex ante prospect may be less 
clear. Civics books, Ann Landers columns, cocktail party 
chatter -- all provide examples of real instances in which a 
single person's vote decided the outcome of an election or 
referendum. Especially since it takes time to become 
14If we alter the analytical assumptions to allow the 
utility of others to enter into his utility function, the 
external benefit to them will be incorporated accordingly. 
15we may also readily envision politicians and special 
interest groups finding such individuals and attempting to 
disseminate information among them. 
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informed, the perception that one's vote might make a 
difference will be important some time before the election, 
when other voters' probable actions are less clear than they 
are when the vote is actually cast. The possibility of 
making a difference, weighted by the importance of that 
difference to one's ultimate wellbeing, may provide some 
incentive to gain information. 
3) Other factors may cause the citizen to consider a 
well-informed vote to be in his own best interest. He may 
feel that greater knowledge enables him to influence the 
votes of others more effectively, increasing his impact at 
the polls beyond that of his own individual vote. 16 
As a parent with a strong interest in the local schools 
who is involved with the PTA and through that organization 
becomes informed about school bond referenda, a voter may 
put up informational signs in his yard and suggest to his 
childless neighbors that voting for the bond referenda will 
benefit them also by enhancing local property values. 
To the extent that elections act as opinion polls that exert 
an independent influence on the outcome, greater information 
16In this role of swaying others he may also, in 
contrast, choose to purvey illusion, if he feels that doing 
so will better serve his interest. This possibility of the 
voter as the source of illusion is a minor but an 
interesting one. It suggests the further possibility that 
he may unknowingly purvey illusions that he himself is 
subject to. 
- - -- -- --- ------
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may enable him to register an opinion that will better serve 
his own ends, an opinion that will have a nonzero impact, 
albeit a small one. 17 
4) Knowledge of fiscal parameters is relevant to a 
variety of decisions the individual makes outside the 
political arena. One such decision is the choice of the 
community one resides in. 18 More complete information about 
fiscal parameters allows a more accurate evaluation of the 
relative merits of alternative locations, with a resulting 
increase in the level of wellbeing attainable. Particularly 
in a setting of high marginal tax rates, possibilities for 
tax-avoidance also give individuals incentives to eliminate 
illusion -- to perceive tax burdens, at least, more 
accurately in order to allocate resources more optimally to 
avoid them. 19 Perception of tax burdens and expenditure 
17Again in this role he may instead foster illusion, 
intentionally or unwittingly. 
18oates (1988b, 76-77) suggests the importance of such 
"Tiebout" decisions and cites evidence from Epple and 
Schipper (1981) supporting the hypothesis that future tax 
liabilities associated with local public debt are 
capitalized into local property values. 
19wagner's analysis of the revenue complexity 
hypothesis suggests that voters have more difficulty 
perceiving the features of a more complex revenue system 
accurately, and that the resulting misperceptions allow a 
greater tax burden to be exacted from them. Perhaps a more 
compelling argument is that splitting a total tax amount 
into a number of smaller levies decreases the incentives to 
avoid any particular levy, increasing the ability to tax and 
to spend when other limits on that ability are not 
effective. In those cases, perhaps ·it is the greater 
85 
benefits also enters into private decisions about work and 
leisure by affecting the perceived real tradeoff between 
leisure and goods and services. It also enters into the 
evaluation of the relative merits of owning and renting 
one's own housing, as well as of locating in a community 
with a high or low proportion of rental housing. Further, 
because people function as producers as well as consumers in 
their lives, there is a whole set of decisions they make in 
their roles as producers that are affected by fiscal 
illusion. These include, but extend far beyond, the 
leisure/work choice already mentioned. Entrepreneurs who 
are misled by fiscal illusion into producing in wasteful 
communities find it harder to get workers to live there and 
pay high taxes that do not generate much value. Business 
taxes that are not productive raise costs without providing 
benefits to compensate the producer for those higher costs 
incurred. If bad fiscal illusion raises a firm's costs 
above those in competing communities that propagate less 
illusion, the firm has an incentive to relocate. 
This whole spectrum of individual choices can be made 
more effectively if the individual, acting as producer or as 
consumer, evaluates fiscal parameters accurately; to the 
extent that the costs of obtaining accurate information are 
difficulty of effective tax avoidance, rather than fiscal 
illusion, that explains any correlation between measures of 
revenue complexity and expenditure levels. 
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justified by these benefits, he has further incentive to 
obtain information rather than remaining prey to his 
illusions. He may discover or "produce" the information 
himself or obtain it from another source, as discussed in 
the next section. It is worth noting that one sort of 
"information" he has the incentive to "produce," in his 
private as well as his voting decisions, is an evaluation of 
bureaucratic bias or manipulation. Citizens may not be the 
gullible individuals they are sometimes pictured to be, easy 
prey for scheming politicians. 
5) Numerous individuals do as citizens have such 
private incentives to analyze the costs and benefits of 
illusion themselves. If there are economies of scale in 
this analysis or comparative advantage in its provision, it 
is possible that private enterprises can sell more accurate 
information on costs and benefits. The press is one such 
organization, a profit-seeking one. Not only major 
newspapers like The Washington Post, The Baltimore Sun, and 
The New York Times, but also The Fairfax Journal, and 
community papers such as The Gazette out of Great Falls find 
profit to be made in providing information, often in an 
entertaining way, that helps to dispel fiscal illusion. 
Television and radio newscasts, local and national, and 
broadcast and print columnists and editorial writers also 
perform this function. 
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Other such enterprises with economies of scale or 
comparative advantage in providing information are voter 
organizations that may be constituted as non-profit 
organizations for tax reasons and receive some subsidy 
thereby but which must to some extent conform to the 
cost/benefit constraints that private enterprises must 
conform to. They include organizations like the local 
Franklin Area Citizens• Association, taxpayer coalitions 
like the Montgomery County Citizens• Task Force, and the 
local and national League of Women Voters. They serve a 
variety of clients, including citizens who want to vote more 
effectively, individuals who want to improve the sorts of 
private decisions seen in item 4), politicians who can gain 
power with the information, and potential politicians. 
In each of these instances, illusion is limited by 
using information supplied by an outside party. A 
supply/demand relationship is involved in this institutional 
framework, which offers individuals the possibility of 
reducing the illusion they are subject to by patronizing a 
supplier of information. 
Thus we see that citizens, consumers or "demanders" of 
both public goods and fiscal illusion, do have some 
important incentives to deal with illusion optimally, 
incentives that play themselves out in different 
institutional settings. The strength of their incentives to 
eliminate illusion varies directly with the damage done 
both because of the impact upon their own wellbeing and 
because of their impact within the collective choice 
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mechanism --when their illusion is sustained. Besides these 
factors that limit fiscal illusion on the "demand" side, 
there are also important forces that work primarily on the 
incentives of the public officials, the "producers" or 
"suppliers. 1120 The primary force, the politician who 
competes for the rewards of office, whose role has already 
been analyzed, is augmented by other "supply" forces. 
III. Additional "Supply" Factors 
1) The usual analysis implicitly treats citizens and 
politicians/bureaucrats as separate and independent 
entities. 21 This treatment extends the useful dichotomy 
(between agents that are providers and agents who are 
consumers) that pervades the whole of microeconomic theory 
to allow for a third group of agents, likewise viewed as 
separate and independent of the other agents. 22 Obscured in 
20The somewhat arbitrary nature of the distinction 
between the "supplier" and the "consumer" has already made 
its appearance in items 3) and 5) and will be addressed 
explicitly at a later point. 
21Tullock (1974) provides an exception to this 
generalization in his recognition that politician-
bureaucrats use their power as voters to reinforce their 
power as politicians. He neglects, however, the analogous 
possibility of citizens' using their potential power as 
politicians to enter the "industry" on the supply side. 
22one would expect the analysis of their maximizing 
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this approach is the potential for citizens to cross the 
dividing line and become politicians or bureaucrats whenever 
the rewards of that activity outweigh the rewards of private 
economic activities within the household or within the firm. 
This potential is the source of additional limits on the 
impact of fiscal illusion. 
In this third sector, parallel in many ways to the 
business sector, the possibility of new entries into the 
"industry" of publicly provided goods and services, should 
in theory tend to drive down the excess of rewards over 
costs there, the pure "profit," to the level of that of 
private industry. This "profit" has some of the same 
elements of being an economically necessary reward to an 
entrepreneurial factor that generates net economic benefit 
by its activity. If it is a scarce factor, it may receive a 
pure rent, one that would have a distributional impact but 
not a direct allocational one. When there are barriers to 
entry in the public sector (e.g., when machines dominate as 
in Chicago or when two major political parties dominate as 
in national elections), competition, whether for candidacy 
for public office or for positions in the bureaucracy, is 
possible within the political unit in power. The greater 
the rewards of the monopoly power, the greater the incentive 
for competitors to overcome the barriers to entry. It is 
behavior to parallel the constrained optimization analysis 
applied to producers and consumers. 
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not just the suspect motivations of the self-interested 
politicians that are brought to bear upon public issues, 
but, by this extension, the motivations and abilities of the 
multitude of "potential politicians" as well. 
2) Besides the political competition within 
jurisdictions, the effect of Tiebout sorting is to mimic the 
results of competition among jurisdictions, providing an 
additional force that places limits upon the politician's 
ability to promote fiscal illusion.~ 
Mutual benefit is the basis of transactions. The 
decision of a household or a business firm to locate in one 
jurisdiction or another depends, among other things, upon 
the degree to which it can extract for itself the surplus 
generated by that decision. To the extent that the benefits 
of efficiently provided public goods and services exceed 
their costs, this surplus is available to induce individuals 
to locate or to remain within the jurisdiction. While this 
surplus is generally available on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis for households, it is increasingly used as a tool in 
BThe incentives of the jurisdictions are not made 
clear in Tiebout's work. The existence of alternatives has 
the same impact upon the consumer's decisions as if they 
actively competed, though they are not seen to compete 
intentionally in the same way that profit-maximizing firms 
do. Actively competitive behaviors may be explained by 
monopoly power of the jurisdictions, which seek to maximize 
their rents, rents which may be reduced by competition from 
other jurisdictions that tends to return those rents to the 
citizens. 
active negotiations between government officials and 
business firms that are considering location within the 
community. 
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To the extent that a jurisdiction eliminates the costs 
associated with fiscal illusion, households and businesses 
will find it more attractive to locate there. Once again, 
as in the case of the competition among politicians seen in 
item 6), the outcome is not the complete elimination of 
illusion, but Tiebout competition will promote the 
elimination of those illusions that can be dispelled at a 
cost less than the damage they do. Further, once again 
competition among the suppliers of the public goods and 
services tends to return the surplus value to the citizens. 
3) The three preceding constraining factors on the 
supply side assume a given set of jurisdictions with given 
political systems or institutional structures. As West and 
Winer (1980, 620-621) note, competition with respect to 
institutional structure, both within a given jurisdiction 
and among jurisdictions, can provide incentives to offer 
fiscal accuracy as an alternative to fiscal illusion. The 
ability to choose and alter the political system limits the 
sway of fiscal illusion. If the institutional structure 
allows the damage done by fiscal illusion to be greater than 
the cost of changing the institutional structure, 
individuals have the incentive either to institute such 
changes or to move to a jurisdiction with a different 
political mechanism. 
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Institutional structure is an implicit force in 
Buchanan's early writings (1960, 1964a, 1967), which 
primarily expand upon the writings of Puviani and Faisani. 
He reflects the situational framework they employ. In it a 
ruler uses the misperceptions of the populace to his own 
ends, and in it the only threat to his power to do so is the 
potential uprising of the people to overthrow of the 
government by revolution. The people have no other means of 
changing fiscal variables, and the ruler has no competitors 
seeking to gain his power for themselves. Docile submission 
and social upheaval seem to be the only two modes of action 
available to the people who are misled by the illusions. 
Within this structure the existence and importance of fiscal 
illusion may indeed by easier to document, but its relevance 
for modern Western democracies is certainly questionable. 
The effect of institutional structure upon the ability 
of the government to deviate from the median preference 
about a fiscal parameter is a central concern in the work of 
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978). They examine three 
different institutional structures (direct democracy, 
representative democracy with referendum, and representative 
democracy without referendum), finding a significant 
influence on the extent of fiscal illusion. This is an 
important finding and suggests a broadening of the scope of 
the inquiry to encompass the conditions which cause those 
institutional differences. One possibility is that the 
choice of a political system that reduces fiscal illusion 
may generate other costs that are greater than those of 
fiscal illusion. West and Winer argue that "the current 
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system reflects a choice (subject to the costs and benefits 
involved) between institutions or governments that maximizes 
the utility of the median voter, given the behavior of the 
government under each alternative. Otherwise we should have 
observed some other budgetary process. 1124 
4) Just as prices act as signals in markets where 
information is costly, so signals can convey information to 
citizens about costs and benefits of government expenditures 
in a way that allows them to economize on costly 
information. Politician stances are one such signal. So 
are the stances of other voters or of other political 
observers (either of which may under the right circumstances 
cross that very permeable line that divides citizens from 
politicians). Again, such signals may summarize a great 
deal of complex information, and because of the concomitant 
loss of information reduce but not eliminate the distortions 
caused by illusion. There is again an "optimal amount of 
fraud," from the viewpoint of the voter as well as from that 
2
4west and Winer (1980, 611). A similar argument has 
been attributed to Dr. Pangloss. 
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of the politician, credence qualities playing an important 
role. Similarly, a vote for a reliable politician may 
convey as accurate a signal about relevant voter preferences 
as a more accurate but also much more costly detailed 
analysis by that citizen of the intricacies of the budgetary 
choices to be made. 
IV. Summary and Implications 
In summary, though the existing literature evinces a 
recurrent concern that fiscal illusion results in 
misallocation of resources to and within the public sector, 
especially through the public officials' manipulation of 
citizens' perceptions, we have seen a considerable array of 
forces that have significant power to contain the ability of 
such illusion to impose significant burdens upon the 
electorate. Foremost among these is the political agent who 
competes for the rewards of office. Beyond this, "demand" 
side forces include 1) the possibility, varying in strength 
with the effect of illusion upon wellbeing, that the citizen 
will perceive the contradiction between the perceived level 
of wellbeing under illusion and the level actually 
attainable; 2) the possibility of his being the decisive 
voter and consequently of his illusion alone determining the 
outcome; 3) his effect upon opinion polls or upon the 
positions of other voters and the resulting impact upon the 
final outcome; 4) the importance of accurate perception of 
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fiscal parameters for private decisions (such as choice of 
community of residence, tax avoidance, work/leisure 
decisions, owningjrenting housing, entrepreneurial 
activities); and 5) the potential of securing information 
efficiently from outside sources. On the "supply" side, 
additional forces limiting the amount of illusion that can 
be generated include 1) competition from potential 
politicians whenever the rewards exceed those available from 
private economic activities within the household or in the 
business sector; 2) alternative illusion levels offered by 
other jurisdictions; 3) alternative levels of illusion 
offered by other potential institutional arrangements within 
the same jurisdiction; and 4) the availability of signals 
that transmit information efficiently. 
I would not be inclined to suggest that fiscal illusion 
does not exist and have an impact, in spite of the many 
limitations on that impact, but it may be that the existing 
limits are largely effective and that they are economically 
efficient in that the costs of further decreasing the amount 
of illusion would be greater than the benefits of the 
resulting decrease. If, however, fiscal illusion is indeed 
found to distort fiscal choices in a way that significantly 
lowers social welfare, then it is to the operation of these 
limiting forces that we may look in trying to reduce those 
distortions. Some indication of the extent of fiscal 
illusion is needed to suggest how hard to pursue such 
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remedies. 
At this stage, it seems that the issue of the impact of 
fiscal illusion upon budgetary outcomes can be resolved only 
through empirical methods, and it is to this that we turn in 
Chapter Five. It will be seen that the existing empirical 
studies that have sought to document the existence and 
importance of fiscal illusion are seriously flawed, 
particularly by the possible endogeneity of the illusion 
variable. The state tax "windfalls" from.the federal Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 provide a unique opportunity to test for 
fiscal illusion in the case of an exogenous illusion 
variable. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF FISCAL ILLUSION 
AND NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE 1986 TAX "WINDFALLS" 
I. Existing Econometric Evidence on Fiscal Illusion 
and Its Theoretical Context 
Through most of the history of the concept of fiscal 
illusion, theory and casual observation lent ready credence 
to the existence and importance of the phenomenon; the 
preceding chapters have given cause to reconsider this ready 
acceptance. It is only more recently, with the new 
technical possibilities that advances in computer 
capabilities have opened, that fiscal illusion has been the 
subject of formal econometric analysis. In the past fifteen 
years a series of econometric studies has examined the 
hypothesis of fiscal illusion in a variety of specific 
manifestations. Oates (1988b) summarizes and assesses this 
literature. Following Oates, Chapter One noted many of the 
significant studies, grouping them according to the variable 
that is misperceived into the five categories of complexity 
of the tax structure, renter illusion with respect to 
property taxation, income elasticity of the tax structure, 
debt illusion, and the flypaper effect. 
Most of the studies surveyed have employed the 
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theoretical framework for the estimation of demand functions 
for local public goods pioneered by Borcherding and Deacon 
(1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). 1 In that original 
work on the demand for local public goods, a multiplicative 
demand function was posited for the median voter relating 
* . the level of public goods demanded by that voter, G , to h~s 
income, Y, and the tax price, T, of those goods: 
G* = a~Y/J. 
His tax price is the product of his tax share, t, and the 
price that must be paid for him to consume an additional 
(1) 
unit of the public good. That unit price in turn depends 
upon the cost of an additional unit of the public good and 
the degree to which it is nonrival in consumption. A 
congestion parameter, t, whose value ranges from o for a 
pure public good to 1 for a pure private good, is 
incorporated into the equation, with 
G* = GN- 'f. (2) 
When both sides of the demand equation are multiplied by the 
unit price of the public good and logarithms are taken, the 
result is an equation of the form 
ln E = ln a + (a + 1) ln P + (a + 1) 1' ln N + aln t + ,Bln Y 
+ v, 
= c + aln N + aln t + ,Bln Y + v, (3) 
1A recent paper by Oates (1986) summarizes and assesses 
this body of work; the remainder of this section follows his 
analysis. 
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which allows the estimation of a, p, and u from cross-
sectional data. Further assumptions, involving some 
troublesome practical compromises, are needed to link 
median-voter income and tax share with available income and 
tax statistics. 2 
Virtually all of the subsequent empirical studies have 
followed this early pattern. Typically, a model of the 
form: 
E = ax + PF + f ( 4) 
is posited, relating E, the level of government 
expenditures, to X, a vector of independent variables not 
affected by illusion, to F, a vector of variables subject to 
fis'cal illusion, and to the usual disturbance term, e. 
Rejection of the hypothesis H0 : PF = 03 is construed as 
evidence that the illusion imparts a significant bias to the 
level of public expenditures and that the resulting 
misallocation of resources reduces the level of wellbeing. 
Yet, in spite of the many and varied studies undertaken, 
Oates argues that the failure to deal with the possible 
2The presumption that aggregate information correlates 
readily to the data relevant to the individual voter who 
happens to have the median preference is a cause for some 
concern. It may be argued that a better approach is to use 
the aggregate data and test for its significance. 
3one variant of this general scheme occurs in the 
flypaper case, where grants-in-aid are seen as increases in 
income which, without illusion, should have the same impact 
on the dependent variable as ordinary increases in income; 
in this case the null hypothesis takes the form PF = Pv, 
where Pv is the coefficient on ordinary income. 
100 
endogeneity of the illusion variable and to discriminate 
among competing hypotheses seriously compromises the 
existing results: in his view, compelling empirical support 
for the existence and significance of fiscal illusion has 
yet to be found. 
II. The Theoretical Context of This Empirical study 
This study of fiscal illusion considers the changes in 
prospective state tax revenues generated by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, the so-called "windfalls," as a source of 
fiscal illusion and tests the illusion hypothesis within the 
same theoretical and empirical structure established in the 
existing literature, though with some modifications. 
The framework for the empirical analysis of 
expenditures and the role of fiscal illusion just presented 
incorporates the same variables seen to be significant in 
the consumer choice theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter Three. one factor in the median voter's choice of 
the level of public goods, G, was the perceived tradeoff 
between public and private goods, i.e., the perceived cost 
of public goods, C, in terms of private goods forgone. 
Another was his income and wealth, which likewise exerted 
their effect on the budget constraint that determined his 
optimal combination on his indifference map. This income 
factor is embodied in the level of private goods available 
to him if he were to spend all his income on them, Xj~ given 
L 
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the prices of private goods, x1 is determined by his money 
income. Grants-in-aid, R, also provide a source of funds 
that expand the budget space; these grants may be partially 
determined by the level of G and by a variety of other 
exogenous variables that reflect the demographic 
characteristics and other factors important in determining 
the size of grants from federal agencies to the states. The 
contours of the indifference map, embodying his tastes and 
preferences, T1, are also an important force in determining· 
his optimal combination of public and private goods. Thus 
far, then, we have 
G1 = f(C, R, x1, T1), with 
R = g(G1, other exogenous variables), 
formulated in real terms. 
(5) 
(6) 
Given the prices of the goods and services, the real 
quantities in these equations can be translated into nominal 
values, the form in which the statistical observations are 
available. Levels of state government provision of goods 
and services are then measured in terms of expenditures, E, 
while c, R, and x1 are now ~easured in dollar terms, with X 
redenominated as Y, or income. 4 The functional form will 
also change to reflect the use of nominal variables. This 
4The discussion in Chapter Three of the difficulty in 
specifying units and prices of the public good is relevant 
here. Separating out the price and quantity components of 
public expenditures, while conceptually easy, has been a 
difficult quest in practice. 
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general formulation, then, fits clearly within the 
Borcherding-DeaconjBergstrom-Goodman framework; some further 
adaptations of that approach appropriate to the empirical 
work of this study are discussed later. 
This study also has a particularly close relationship 
to two cases that have been the subject of numerous studies 
in the existing literature: the flypaper hypothesis and the 
revenue elasticity hypothesis. These have in common the 
idea that when additional revenues not consciously 
appropriated to public uses through legislated tax increases 
become available, fiscal illusion on the part of the voters 
allows public officials to use those revenues to increase 
public expenditures to serve their own ends rather than 
disposing of them as the voters would prefer. In the 
flypaper case, the additional revenues come from 
intergovernmental grants; in the revenue elasticity case, 
they are generated by progressive elements in the tax code 
which increase tax revenues by a higher percentage than the 
income increases that give rise to them. In both cases, the 
additional revenues are "automatic" in that they do not 
result from the conscious actions of the voters or their 
representatives. Were these revenues returned to the 
taxpayers in the form of a tax cut, the taxpayers would use 
them as any other income increase, according to their tastes 
and preferences and according to the structure of prices 
they face in the marketplace and in the collective choice 
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mechanism. Collective goods and services provided by the 
government would be but one of many sources of satisfaction 
they would choose to obtain with their additional funds. 
The studies of the effects of these two sources of 
automatic revenue increases have found that they do not have 
the same impact on levels of government spending as ordinary 
increases in income, supporting the hypothesis of fiscal 
illusion: that public officials have the ability to retain 
these revenues for public uses because of fiscal illusion on 
the part of the voters, who do not correctly perceive that 
the funds could be returned to them in the form of a tax 
cut. Persuasive as this rationale is, the possible 
endogeneity of the grants-in-aid variable and of the tax-
structure elasticity variable requires careful econometric 
treatment; in both cases the causation may be reversed, with 
expenditures partially determining the amount of grant 
monies received and the degree of revenue elasticity built 
into the tax structure. As yet, the econometric problems 
presented by the endogeneity of the revenue elasticity 
variable have not been dealt with in a compelling way. The 
flypaper studies have been more careful to correct for the 
endogenous portion of grants-in-aid. Oates (1988b, 78) 
argues, however, that competing hypotheses, particularly the 
Remer-Rosenthal agenda control hypothesis, may account for 
the econometric results. 
The windfalls generated by the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
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provide a unique opportunity to examine the issue of fiscal 
illusion for the case of an exogenous illusion variable. 
Though widely perceived as costless boons, the "windfalls" 
do not in fact represent "manna from Washington" (Gold, 
431). Like the revenues from grants-in-aid and from an 
income-elastic tax structure in a period of rising incomes, 
the windfalls are "automatic" changes in state government 
revenues, but, in contrast, these changes are an unintended 
byproduct of national legislative action, independent of the 
states' decisions concerning the level of expenditures. Has 
fiscal illusion allowed the politician-bureaucrats the 
leeway to direct these changes in revenues to their own ends 
rather than the citizens' interest? The next section 
examines the origins and characteristics of the windfalls 
themselves. It is followed by econometric testing of the 
hypothesis of fiscal illusion for these exogenous, 
"automatic" revenue changes. 
III. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the "Windfalls" 
The Tax Reform Act was passed by the U. S. Congress in 
1986 to promote fairness by lessening the transfer of 
economic power to those with economic advantages in areas of 
tax-preferred activities, to reduce the costs of complying 
with complex and obscure tax provisions, and to enhance the 
efficiency of decision making by minimizing the tax 
consequences of individual choices. For the federal 
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personal income tax, it significantly lowered marginal tax 
rates, simplified procedures, and broadened the tax base. 
Enacted in response to the concerns of the national 
legislature over these issues of fairness, simplicity, and 
efficiency, the act has a largely unintended impact upon 
state tax revenues. This impact can be understood better by 
considering its effects in terms of two distinct components, 
one caused by automatic state tax revisions triggered by the 
changes in the federal tax code, another by behavioral 
changes induced by the new federal tax treatment of various 
economic activities. 
Part of the impact upon state tax revenues, then, 
results from how the Federal tax code is reflected in state 
codes. Even if individual households and firms made no 
changes in their behavior, tax revenues for states would 
change if provisions in state codes link state tax 
liabilities to elements of the federal tax code that were 
altered. Because of a concordance of value judgments and to 
diminish costs of compliance for the individual and for the 
state -- recordkeeping and computational costs, 
administrative and enforcement costs -- many states do in 
fact choose to link in some way to the federal tax 
structure. The most common individual provisions that state 
codes couple to5 include 
5The table and footnotes in Appendix A of the u.s. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations study 
(1987) describe these linkages. Tannenwald (1987) also 
the standard deduction, 
itemized deductions, 
the dollar amount of the personal exemption, 
the number of personal exemptions, 
the treatment of long-term capital gains, 
the IRA deduction, 
the two-earner deduction, 
the state and local income tax deduction, 
the state and local property and sales tax 
deduction, 
the personal interest expense deduction, 
federal credits, and 
federal itemizing status. 
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In addition, some states allow a deduction for the federal 
tax liability. Further, particular combinations of these 
and other individual provisions form the basis for state tax 
collections when states couple to federal definitions of 
gross income, adjusted gross income., taxable income, gross 
tax liability, or actual tax liability. Because each state 
chooses its own method of linking from the myriad of 
possible combinations of particular provisions, the impact 
of this linkage varies widely over the states. 
The impact of the Tax Reform Act upon state revenues 
has a second component that applies to all states, whether 
discusses many of these possibilities. 
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or not they link to federal income tax provisions. By 
altering the relative after-tax prices of different economic 
activities, the federal tax changes generate systematic 
adjustments in individuals' behavior. Indeed, it was a 
major purpose of the federal tax reform to make economic 
activity more rational and ultimately to generate greater 
satisfaction for individuals by removing distortions in 
relative prices introduced by a patchwork of individual tax 
provisions accumulated over the years. 6 These changes in 
behavior, by affecting the allocation of resources to 
activities that are taxed at the state level, have an impact 
upon the amounts of state taxes collected. Even if a state 
has no income tax, other sources of state revenues may be 
affected because the federal tax code changes generate 
behavioral changes that affect other taxed activities. 
These behavioral responses and their impact are particularly 
difficult to analyze and predict. 7 
Tannenwald effectively introduces a framework for the 
linkage to the federal code and the many possible variations 
6Even changes in the tax prov1s1ons that have a small 
or even zero estimated impact on tax revenues can be very 
important sources of enhanced wellbeing by changing 
behavior, as, for example, when lower tax rates allow an 
individual to attain a higher indifference curve by 
increasing the individual's optimal quantity of labor 
supplied and leaving his tax liability unchanged. 
7The ACIR estimates of.personal income tax windfalls 
used in this study attempt to incorporate such behavioral 
changes. 
it embodies by describing the process an individual goes 
through in computing his federal income tax liability: 
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(1) adding up his wages salaries, interest, dividends, 
rents, royalties, and other includable items to determine 
his gross income, 
(2) subtracting from this figure certain costs of 
earning income and other allowable items to get his adjusted 
gross income, 
(3) further subtracting personal exemptions and either 
a standard or itemized deduction to obtain his taxable 
income, 
(4) applying a set of rates to his taxable income to 
obtain his gross tax liability before tax credits, and 
(5) subtracting any tax credits he is eligible for to 
determine his actual tax liability to the federal 
government. 
The specific provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
can be introduced into this broad framework. Its general 
thrust is that it significantly lowers tax rates for 
individuals and vastly simplifies them, while broadening the 
tax base. Changes in filing requirements raise the income 
level for which a return is required: many individuals have 
been removed from the tax rolls. overall, tax liabilities 
are about six to seven percent lower. These general effects 
resulted from the many specific provisions that change the 
computation of an individual's federal income tax liability. 
As Tannenwald concluded, "TRA alters the rules at every 
stage of the process." 
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The determination of the individual's gross income has 
been altered by the Act's limitation of the ability to shift 
income to a child to a maximum of $1000 per child. This 
change raises gross income and ultimately the federal tax 
liability of the individuals affected by it. 
The adjustments to gross income involved in calculating 
adjusted gross income (AGI) have been greatly restricted by 
the Act, with AGI and federal tax liabilities increasing as 
a consequence. These changes include 
the repeal of the partial exclusion of dividends, 
the repeal of the exclusion of unemployment 
compensation,· 
the repeal of the two-earner deduction, 
the inclusion of the full amount (rather than just 
40%) of net capital gain as income, 
the phasing out of IRA deductions for middle- and 
high-income earners, 
the limitation of the deductibility of certain 
business expenses, including employees• meals 
and entertainment expenses and business-
related travel expenses, 
the restriction of the deductibility of losses 
from passive activities and of offsets of 
credits from passive activities, and 
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the repeal of the exclusion of scholarship aid for 
nondegree students, and of scholarship 
amounts for room and board or travel, and of 
pay for services required by all degree 
students. 
Exemptions and deductions used to determine federal 
taxable income were also thoroughly reworked. Personal 
exemption amounts have almost doubled, from $1080 in 1986 to 
$1950 in 1988 (and on up to $2000 in 1989), though they are 
phased out at higher levels of income, and though no longer 
can one claim one's own exemption while being claimed as a 
dependent by another. standard deduction amounts are 
substantially higher for 1988 and after and have replaced 
the zero bracket amount that had been built into the tax 
table and the tax rate schedule. Additional standard 
deductions for those over 65 or blind largely offset the 
additional exemptions lost by those individuals. All these 
changes together tend to reduce amounts of taxes owed. 
For those who itemized deductions in the past, much of 
the advantage of itemizing has been lost with the 
elimination or limitation of special provisions. These 
changes include 
the restriction of deductibility of mortgage 
interest, 
the phasing out, over four years, of the 
deductibility of other personal interest, 
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the repeal of the deductibility of state and local 
sales taxes, 
the restriction of moving expense deductibility to 
itemizers only, 
the restriction of the deductibility of charitable 
contributions to itemizers only, 
the limitation of deductibility of medical and 
dental expenses to amounts over 7~% 
(rather than 5% as before) of adjusted gross 
income), and 
the qualification that other miscellaneous 
itemized deductions are deductible only if 
they exceed 2% of adjusted gross income. 
Tax liabilities tend to rise as a result of each of these 
changes. 
The tax rates applied to taxable income to determine 
the gross tax liability have been significantly lowered. 
The rate structure has been vastly simplified, from fifteen 
brackets in 1986 to two, 15% and 28%, in 1988 (though the 
phaseout of the 15% rate and the personal exemption at 
higher incomes effectively creates four brackets for each 
taxpayer). In addition, the repeal of income averaging 
simplifies the procedure and increases the tax liability for 
those individuals affected. Also affecting the actual tax 
liability is the repeal of the partial credit for political 
contributions. 
Each change generates behavioral adjustments; each 
affects the linkages with state tax codes. The combined 
impacts of all these changes and their repercussions are 
embodied in the changes in the state tax revenues that 
resulted. 
IV. Estimates of State Tax Windfall Amounts 
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For each of the fifty states, estimates of the personal 
income tax windfall amounts, both total and per capita, have 
been calculated and are presented in Table 1. As the table 
indicates, estimated windfalls vary widely in per-capita 
terms, ranging from a high of $64.37 in Colorado to a low of 
-$32.64 in Vermont. The wide variations reflect different 
state populations and incomes, as well as different ways and 
degrees of linking with the federal tax code. 
0% 
Seven states (AK, FL, NEV, SD, TX, WA, WY) have no 
personal income tax, so that there can be no impact upon 
personal income tax collections. (Figures above the states 
show ACIR percentage estimates of the windfalls.) Even they 
may have differences in total tax collections because of the 
effects of behavioral adjustments to federal provisions upon 
other state sources of revenue. 8 Another four states 
-1% 
(NH, NJ, PA, TN) do tax personal income but do not base the 
amount on the federal tax code in any way. For these 
states, again, there should be only the effects of 
8They are listed by ACIR as having no windfall. 
TABLE 1 
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA TAX WINDFALL AMOUNTS 
1 Connecticut 
2 Maine (ME) 
3 Massachusetts (MA) 
4 New Hampshire 




9 New Jersey 










17 Iowa (IA) 
18 Kansas 
19 Minnesota (MN) 
20 Missouri (MO) 
21 Nebraska 
22 North Dakota 
















































9Total windfall amounts are in thousands of dollars. 
These values were calculated on the basis of the preliminary 
percentage estimates of the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations and 1986 state income tax figures. 
The ACIR estimates reflect the assumption that state 
legislatures do not alter state tax laws in any way in 
response to federal tax reform. Data for four states (Iowa, 
South Carolina, Arizona, and New Mexico) not available from 
the ACIR study were supplied from National Conference of State 
Legislatures figures. 
10Per capita windfall amounts are in dollars per person. 
These figures are based on the figures in the first column and 
on population figures from the u.s. Bureau of the Census for 
July 1, 1986 (provisional). 
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24 Alabama (AL) 7572.9 1. 87 
25 Arkansas (AR) -10197.4 -4.30 
26 Florida 0 o.oo 
27 Georgia 19451.9 3.19 
28 Kentucky 24596.8 6.60 
29 Louisiana 128138.1 28.47 
30 Mississippi (MS) 10904.5 4.15 
31 North Carolina -22067.5 -3.49 
32 South Carolina -4536.5 -1.34 
33 Tennessee -674.3 -0.14 
34 Virginia 195684.5 33.81 
35 West Virginia 4785.9 2.49 
36 Arizona 110000.0 33.16 
37 New Mexico 54000.0 36.51 
38 Oklahoma 123776.3 37.45 
39 Texas 0 0.00 
40 Colorado 210304.8 64.37 
41 Idaho -2559.7 -2.55 
42 Montana 32721.0 39.95 
43 Utah 85793.2 51.53 
44 Wyoming 0 0.00 
45 California 227361.2 8.43 
46 Nevada 0 o.oo 
47 Oregon 0 o.oo 
48 Washington 0 o.oo 
49 Alaska 0 0.00 
50 Hawaii -4677.9 -4.40 
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behavioral adjustments to the federal changes upon other 
state revenues to contend with. 
Between this extreme of independence from the federal 
tax code and the opposite extreme of complete, automatic 
linkage to it, the degree to which states are affected will 
vary, in general according to the stage at which they 
link to the federal code, and in part, to which particular 
aspects of each stage they have chosen to couple their 
code. 
1% -2% 11% 4% -1% 
Five other states (AL, ARK, CT, MS, NC) couple to more 
or less isolated specific provisions of the federal code, 
and there is considerable variation in this group. 
Mississippi, whose estimated windfall is about 
$10 million, automatically couples to federal itemized 
deductions, to state and local income and property and sales 
tax deductions, and to the personal interest expense 
deductions. On the other hand, North Carolina's only link 
is to the IRA deduction as of January 1983. 
Four states couple to federal taxable income, but 
-1% <1% <1% 
three (ID, OR, SC) do so as of a specific date, while only 
19% 
one, Utah, does so automatically. Automatic coupling 
incorporates almost all of the base-broadening provisions, 
including those in deductions and exemptions, so that the 
estimated impact on Utah is substantial, $89 million. Those 
which couple as of a specific date will require a conscious 
decision to update their linkage to reap a windfall. 
Without that vote, little windfall impact will accrue. 
ne 2% 1% -1% 1% ne 3% 2% 
Twenty-five states (AZ, CA, GA, HA, IN, IO, KY, ME, 
1% 1% -2% 
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MN, WV, WI) couple to adjusted gross income, but of these, 
eleven do so as of a specified date, and like those states 
above, will experience little windfall without conscious 
legislative action to update their references. The 
22% 10% 7% 16% 28% 8% 1% 18% 
group of fourteen states (CO, DE, IL, KA, LA, MD, MI, MO, 
19% ne 9% 7% 18% 9% 
MT, NM, NY, OH, OK, VA) which couple automatically to AGI 
shows the greatest windfall impacts for the most states. 
Only Massachusetts couples to federal gross income, but 
it does so as of a specific date, so that without action to 
update its linkage, its windfall is also small. Though the 
changes in rates do affect the gross federal tax liability, 
no states couple to this alone. 
-9% -12% -11% -11% 
Those states (NEB, NO, RI, VT) which use federal tax 
liability as the basis for their state tax automatically 
incorporate all provisions of the Tax Reform Act and are 
directly affected by the lowering of the tax rates and the 
simplification of the tax rate structure that tend to 
decrease individuals' tax liabilities to the federal 
government. Since federal tax liabilities have decreased in 
these states -- the broader base less than offsetting the 
impact of the lower rates -- windfall amounts in these 
states are negative. 11 
11Some states allow a deduction for federal income tax 
paid. These too automatically incorporate the federal 
changes to the extent that this provision affects their tax 
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V. The Tax Windfalls as a Test of the Illusion Hypothesis 
The general formulation of the demand equation for 
public goods discussed on pages 97-99 can be augmented and 
rewritten in a linear regression formulation that is suited 
to the statistical analysis of the impact of the state tax 
windfalls, while consistent with the literature on the 
demand function for public goods in a median voter context 
and with the body of empirical work on fiscal illusion that 
already exists. For this linear, cross-sectional regression 
analysis, then, the budgeted expenditures of the state are 
related to the windfalls and the other relevant variables in 
the following model: 
(7) 
where 
E1 = the budgeted expenditure of the ith state 
(FY 1988), in thousands of dollars per capita, 
Y1 personal income for residents of the ith state 
(1986), in thousands of dollars per capita, 
w1 = estimated windfall amount for the ith state, 
as presented in Table 1, in dollars per 
capita, 
revenues. There are fifteen such states (CO, DE, KA, LA, 
MO, MT, OK, AZ, IO, KY, MN, UT, OR, ND, AL), including three 
(OK, MN, ND) with this in an optional setting, and two (DE, 
OR) with a partial deduction. See ACIR Appendix A for 
details. 
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R1 intergovernmental revenue of the ith state 
from the federal government (1986), in dollars 
per capita, 
C1 an indicator of the cost of providing public 
goods as measured by average October earnings 
of the employees of the ith state, per full-
time employee (1985), in dollars, 
S; an indicator of the state's share in providing 
public goods, as measured by the percentage of 
state and local general revenue of which the 
ith state was the final recipient {1984), 
N1 =the population of the ith state (~986), in 
thousands, 
U1 = percentage of the ith state's population 
living in metropolitan areas (~985) , 
D1 =population density for the ith state (1985}, 
in persons per square mile of land area. 
The data used in running the regression12 reflect the 
information available to lawmakers early in 1987 as they 
deliberated the first budgets to be passed after the fall 
1986 enactment of the Tax Reform Act. It is in the 
resulting budgets for FY1988, covering expenditures from 
approximately mid-1987 to mid-1988, that the impact of the 
windfalls could first be expected to show itself. 
12The data sources are given in the Appendix. 
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The Bergstrom-GoodmanjBorcherding-Deacon approach 
employed a multiplicative demand function. The linear 
formulation used in other studies and used here avoids two 
econometric problems: the specification of the properties 
of the disturbance term in a way that maintains the 
desirable properties of the estimators, 13 and the fact that 
negative values of the windfalls preclude their 
transformation into logarithmic form. 14 
The use of per capita figures reflects the recognition 
that state governments provide not only pure public goods 
but also goods and services which are at least partially 
private, having significant divisibility among the 
individuals who consume them. Munley and Greene (1978) 
established the implications of this consideration early on 
by demonstrating that Wagner's findings {1976) supporting 
the revenue complexity hypotheses evaporated when the 
specification of the equation was altered to allow for the 
possibility of congestion. Other empirical work supports 
13
€ multiplied into demand function has two untenable 
implications: that per capita expenditure has negative 
values whenever the disturbance term has a negative value 
(assuming constant term is positive; the reverse, if it is 
negative) and that, if E(€) = o, E(Y) = 0. eE multiplied in 
avoids those problems, but the relationship between eE and € 
is nonlinear, and if e' is assumed to have the standard, 
desirable properties, then its logarithmic transformation is 
heteroskedastic. 
14The linear specification may be conceptually more 
appropriate also. At least in the case where the windfall 
amount is zero or negative, a multiplicative demand function 
would imply zero or negative expenditure levels. 
---.:...:.::..:........ _______ _ 
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the hypothesis of significant congestibility of local public 
goods, with congestion parameter estimates generally 
approaching unity. Even though recent work has suggested 
that these estimates may be biased upward, the existence of 
significant congestion provides solid ground for the use of 
per capita figures for empirical work. 
Yi and Ri reflect the ability to pay for public goods. 
The recognition of the endogeneity of R further 
differentiates this treatment from most of the work on the 
demand for public goods, even though the existence of 
simultaneity has long been recognized, with Gramlich's 
(1977) survey noting this point in the work of Oates and of 
Pogue and Sgontz. The endogeneity of R is made explicit in 
equation (6), which shows Rasa function of G and "other 
exogenous variables." outside exogenous variables used in 
this study include the percentage of the population 
seventeen years and under, the percentage of the population 
sixty-five years and older, federal surface area, highway 
mileage, percentage black and Spanish-origin minorities, and 
percentage of persons below the poverty level. These items 
are important in the various formulas used to determine 
grant levels for programs administered by federal agencies. 
Such examples as the Department of Transportation's highway 
safety grants and urban formula capital grants, Health and 
Human Services's medicaid and child support and welfare 
programs, Labor's summer youth employment programs, 
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Education's school program improvement grants, and 
Agriculture's food programs for children are among the many 
examples of programs whose formulas use these variables in 
determining grants to individual states. As discussed 
later, the impact of the endogeneity has implications for 
the estimation technique appropriate for equation (7) rather 
than its form. 
The c1 variable is an indicator of the cost of the 
public goods. In the Bergstrom-GoodmanjBorcherding-Deacon 
analysis, if there are constant returns to scale, and 
production functions are identical across states, and if 
capital is mobile across states but labor is not, then unit 
costs across states will vary with the price of laboro 
Though a standard assumption in the literature on local 
public goods, the uniformity of the production function has 
been called into question by the work of Hamilton (1983) and 
of Schwab and Zampelli (1987) that views community 
characteristics as "inputs" in the production function. If 
this factor is significant, the misspecification would bias 
not only the estimated coefficient on income but the others 
as well. Though a persuasive argument has been advanced, a 
convincing case for the direction and extent of this impact 
has yet to be made: further techniques for incorporating 
this view into the demand for public goods without the 
hobbling assumption of a linear expenditure system must be 
developed before this insight is usable. The assumption of 
L 
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constant returns to scale within each jurisdiction, also 
standard, is less likely to be restrictive in an analysis 
like this one that uses state governments rather than local 
governments as the cross-sectional units. 
Consistent with the use of per capita figures to 
reflect the assumption that the goods and services provided 
by the state have a significant private-good component, the 
inclusion of Ni allows for the effect of the publicness of 
those goods in making per capita provision cheaper as 
population increases. To the extent that public goods are 
nonrival in consumption, a larger population allows their 
cost to be spread among a larger number of taxpayers, 
decreasing the tax price to the individual, whatever the tax 
structure of the community. Ni may also capture possible 
effects of economies of scale in production of the goods, 
though, as discussed in conjunction with the production 
function, these are generally assumed to be negligible. 
Another interpretation of the Ni variable is as an indicator 
of the rigidities of the public choice mechanism, as large 
numbers of citizens increase the difficulty of arriving at a 
consensus. Unlike the other two population effects, such 
rigidities may exert an upward pull on the expenditure 
level. Borcherding (1977) has suggested this possibility, 
attributing the influence of population size to its 
enhancement of the power of bureaucrats whose budget-
maximizing behavior fits the pattern described by Niskanen. 
L 
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Oates (1988a) also sees a possible positive impact of 
population on expenditures from a different source, arguing 
that more populous jurisdictions tend to expand the range of 
services offered. His argument is in the context of public 
goods provided by local governments rather that those 
provided by states, where this "zoo effect'.' may be less 
relevant. 
For this study, the regression equation should 
incorporate an additional variable reflecting the fact that 
the state government is the cross-sectional unit. The 
division between state and local governments of the 
responsibility for providing public goods varies greatly 
among states and is a major factor in explaining the level 
of state expenditures (NASBO, 3). The "share" variable, si, 
allows for this effect. 
Besides these factors generally agreed to affect 
decisions about the amount of public goods, Ui and D; are 
included as "tastes and preferences" or "need" variables 
that vary across states and may affect the amounts of public 
goods desired. The constant term will also reflect the net 
impact of the nonrandom component of other "taste" 
variables. 
The W; variable introduces the windfalls as a potential 
determining factor in the level of expenditures. This 
variable is of particular interest in this study because of 
the windfalls' potential susceptibility to fiscal illusion, 
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being widely perceived as generating costless additions to 
state coffers; it is of particular interest in the illusion 
literature as a whole because it is an illusion variable 
whose values are exogenously determined. This feature 
distinguishes the windfalls from the sources of illusion in 
the existing econometric studies. Further desirable 
characteristics make wi an appealing object of study. The 
matrix of its partial coefficients of correlation with the 
other variables reveals no close correspondences; this 
should facilitate the isolation of the effect of the 
windfalls from the effects of the other independent 
variables. Moreover, as analyzed in the preceding section 
of this study, the Wi variable itself shows the high degree 
of variation from state to state needed to determine its 
effect upon the dependent variable. 
The hypothesis of interest from the standpoint of 
fiscal illusion focuses on the value of p2 • It is worth 
noting that the hypothesis appropriate for the windfall. case 
differs from the hypothesis of the studies that examine 
grants-in-aid for evidence of fiscal illusion. In those 
studies the additional funds represent additional revenues 
that come into the state's treasury primarily from sources 
outside the state. These "automatic" increases in state 
government revenues truly increase the total income of its 
residents; in the absence of illusion, this income could be 
returned to the taxpayers in the form of tax cuts, as an 
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increase in their disposable incomes. In the absence of 
illusion, then, these additional revenues should induce the 
same increases in state public as increases in income from 
other sources do, and the corresponding null hypothesis is 
that the coefficients on both of those revenue variables are 
the same. 
In contrast, the tax windfalls of this study do not 
represent an exogenous injection of income, as the term 
"windfall" misleadingly suggests. Rather, these are changes 
in state tax revenues that occurred when the federal 
government shifted the tax rules, altering the state's claim 
upon its residents' incomes. They are in fact "unlegislated 
tax changes" and should, in principle, have no effect on 
voters' preferred levels of expenditure. The appropriate 
form for the null hypothesis in the windfall case, 
corresponding to the absence of illusion, is H0 : p2 = 0. 
Choices of different levels of state government expenditures 
and the corresponding taxes were .possible before the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 but such provisions were not enacted. In 
the absence of illusion, the choice of the voters should not 
change because of the "windfalls"; the unlegislated tax 
changes should be "returned" to the voters in the form of 
unchanged tax and expenditure levels. The alternative 
hypothesis, consistent with an illusion impact, is 
H1 : p2 > o, implying that higher windfalls are in fact 
related to higher spending levels. 
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To correct for the possible endogeneity of the grants-
in-aid variable, with its implications of biased and 
inconsistent estimates for all coefficients and invalid 
conclusions from the associated tests of hypotheses, a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique was 
employed. Accordingly, in the second stage of the 
estimation process, an unbiased, consistent estimator of the 
A 
exogenously determined component of R;, R;, replaces R; in 
the regression equation. This estimator has the additional 
desirable property of being uncorrelated with e1 , so that in 
the second stage, least squares will give consistent 
estimates of all the coefficients. 
A 
The values of R; for 
this sample were determined in the first stage using 
additional outside exogenous variables noted earlier that 
are important in the various formulas used to determine 
grant levels for programs administered by federal agencies. 
Most of the previous studies of illusion have not modified 
the estimation procedures to correct for the possible 
endogeneity of grants-in-aid. 
Results of the 2SLS estimation of equation (7) are 
presented in equation (8), 
E = -3.306 + 0.053Y + 0.001W - 0.0004R + 0.001C + 0.0345 
(-7.28) (1.53) (0.54) (-0.34) (3.41) (4.94) 
+ 0.000006N - 0.0030 + 0.000040 
(0.51) (-0.60) (0.11) 
R2 = 0.75 
n = 50 
(8) 
~~---~~~~~- ~----~~--- -~~ --~------=-os-ao--111111111111·~· 
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with t-values for the estimated coefficients shown in 
parentheses. Only the cost variable, the share variable, 
and the constant term are significant; each is significant 
at the 0.01 level. These results are consistent with most 
of the studies in the literature. 15 Of particular interest, 
A 
P2, the estimated coefficient of the windfall variable was 
not significant. 
There remains some concern that the impact of the 
relatively small windfalls could be swamped by the other 
forces determining absolute levels of expenditures in the 
earlier form of the regression equation. State expenditures 
per capita ranged from $454.21 to $4,237.45, with a mean 
value of $928.52, while the windfall per capita ranged from 
-$32.64 to $64.37, with a mean absolute windfall per capita 
15The fact that the estimated coefficient on income is 
not significant is of some interest. The usual assumption 
is that income is a significant determinant of state 
government expenditures and that public goods are normal 
(positive income elasticities) at least and possibly 
superior (income elasticities> 1). But a review of the 
existing empirical studies of fiscal illusion turns up some 
interesting results: as often as not the estimated 
coefficient on income is not significant, and, when it is, 
its values are difficult to interpret. (Curiously, almost 
all the support is associated with a multiplicative 
specification of the demand function.) One possible reason 
is that because of their redistributive effects, state 
government expenditures may not necessarily change in the 
same direction as income levels. If income decreases, 
individuals may prefer more expenditures on redistributive 
programs. Moreover, a rise in income could result in the 
need for fewer public goods (parks, schools, libraries) as 
people can afford more private goods (large yards, private 
schooling, books). The case, theoretical and empirical, for 
a positive and significant coefficient on income has not yet 
been conclusively made. 
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of $16.93. 16 The changes in state expenditures per capita 
ranged from -$72.54 to $165.08, with a mean absolute value 
of $52.20. These changes in state government expenditures 
are more nearly commensurate with the changes in state 
government revenues that the windfalls represent. 
Accordingly, an alternative specification of the windfall 
equation, in the spirit of a fixed-effects model, was 
tested. In it the change in per capita expenditures was 
regressed against the per capita windfall amounts (which 
also represent changes, in the level of incomes), according 
to the following model: 
/).Ei = P, + /32Wi + E:i' (9) 
and with the resulting estimated equation: 
AE = 0.044 + 0.00004 w (10) 
(5.48) (0.14) 
R2 = 0.0004 
n 50 
The findings for the fiscal illusion hypothesis confirm the 
earlier results from equation (8). The estimated 
coefficient of the windfall variable is not significant and 
the equation has virtually no explanatory power, as 
evidenced by the extremely low R2 • Whatever changes in 
expenditures have occurred, they do not appear to be 
explained by the windfalls. 17 
16The mean value of wi, or windfall per capita, was 
$0.11. However, since there were both positive and negative 
windfalls, the mean absolute windfall per capita of $16.93 
is more relevant for comparing the magnitudes involved. 
17The possibility that asymmetries in the effects of 
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VI. Some Further Thoughts on the Findings 
The earlier chapters of this work provide theoretical 
support for the proposition that fiscal illusion, widespread 
though it may be, need DQt exert a decisive impact upon the 
level and composition of government expenditures. The 
empirical results of this study are consistent with that 
view. The insignificance of the estimated coefficient of 
the windfall variable is exactly what one would expect if 
there are effective incentives for individual agents to 
dispel illusion when that illusion has a distorting impact 
upon collective decisions. The observation of communities 
as they actually dealt with the windfall issue revealed a 
variety of individuals whose self-interested actions 
promoted legislative decisions that were based upon accurate 
views of the nature and magnitude of the windfalls. 
There are other possible explanations of the absence of 
an observable windfall effect in the data that are 
available. Uncertainty about the amount of the windfall has 
positive and negative windfalls might be masked within the 
combined data was also considered. Accordingly, Equation 
(9) was estimated separately for states with positive 
windfalls and for states with negative windfalls. In each 
case the earlier results were left unchanged: the 
coefficient on the windfall variable was not significant and 
the explanatory power of the relationship, as measured by 
the R 2 value, was low. This was true even though the one-
tailed tests appropriate to these separate hypothesized 
relationships narrow the confidence intervals, facilitating 
the rejection of the null hypothesis, H: ~2 = 0. 
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been prominent in the states' deliberations. If state 
levels of expenditure do adjust to maximize expected 
utility, the presence of uncertainty will reduce the level 
of state expenditures that will maximize the expected value 
of that utility for a risk-averse constituency. Steven Gold 
(1987, 431) notes particularly that behavioral changes are a 
source of uncertainty, with taxpayer responses to the new 
treatments of capital gains, IRAs, interest income and 
expenses, and the benefits of incorporation difficult to 
predict. 18 Another possibility associated with the 
uncertainties in the w1 values is that the disposition of 
the windfalls may change as time removes more and more of 
them. Observation of the legislative and executive 
processes of the states as they have adopted their FY 1988 
budgets confirms the awareness of uncertainty and its 
implications. As time passes, their actions may reveal more 
about the importance of this factor. 
The rigidities of the decision-making process may also 
partially account for the results. 1987 was an eventful 
year for state tax reform. The groundwork for much of this 
reform had been laid by tax study commissions earlier in the 
1980's. The unintended and unlegislated impacts of the 1986 
18Econometrically, the existence of even random, 
unbiased error in the w. variable has implications for the 
test results. By incre~sing the variance of the estimator, 
it widens the confidence interval, making rejection of the 
null hypothesis more difficult. 
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federal tax reforms upon both revenues and economic behavior 
provided a catalyst for state actions that had already been 
contemplated (Gold, 431). Revision of the federal tax code 
caused attention to be paid to budget issues and called for 
state changes in response to divergences between federal 
changes and state preferences. It is even possible that the 
spur of having to deal with the windfall could cause state 
expenditures to be inversely related to the windfalls, if 
rigidities had previously checked the implementation of 
opposing desires. 19 It is also possible that illusion and 
rigidity could offset each other, giving a zero net impact, 
if changes enacted by state legislatures included changes 
decided upon earlier but not yet implemented in addition to 
the responses to federal tax changes. 
It is clear, however, that the absence of an observed 
windfall impact is also consistent with the thesis that 
there are effective limitations on the sway of fiscal 
illusion. 
19In this case the appropriate alternative hypothesis 
would take the form H1 : p2 ~ 0, and the confidence intervals 
for testing would be adjusted accordingly. Since the effect 
of a two-tailed test is to widen the interval of test values 
for which one accepts H0 , acceptance of the null hypothesis 




VII. Additional Perspectives 
on the Disposition of the Windfalls 
The broad outlines of the disposition of the windfalls 
in the various states give a useful additional perspective 
on the empirical results already presented and discussed. 
States reacted to the windfalls in a variety of ways, with 
widely differing outcomes. 20 
The decisions about the windfalls were not made in 
isolation but in the context of other developments in state 
financial matters. Tax reform sentiments at the state level 
echoed national ones: increasing progressivity to correct 
for its diminution by years of inflation and reducing tax 
rates in states where they were especially high were notable 
trends. States' financial positions were not strong: year-
end balances were low, continuing a downward trend over the 
decade. States which depended on farm and oil revenues had 
particularly severe problems. A state's disposition of its 
windfall depended upon its entire budgetary picture as well 
as upon the windfall itselfo 
20It was, in fact, not necessary for the subject to be 
on the agenda of the states. It was partially for this 
reason that the statistical study undertaken here was 
formulated as it was, in terms of the effects upon state 
expenditures that could occur in the absence of any direct 
action by the legislatures. Further, it was felt that it 
would be hard to disentangle adjustments to the windfall 
from tax changes made for internal policy reasons. 
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Of those states with positive windfalls, fourteen chose 
to keep all, for a total amount of $935.5 million, while 
thirteen chose to return all, for a total of $1,853.4 
million, and five chose to keep part. 21 Of the states that 
kept all, two raised taxes still further. Of these states, 
many were in distressed economic conditions, and the issue 
was often controversial. Idaho, with much controversy, 
chose not only to continue to conform automatically to 
federal changes but also to add two new tax rates, raising 
its top rate from 7.5% to 8.2%. Utah also increased 
progressivity while increasing its revenues. While Iowa and 
Kansas did conform to the new federal tax base, they 
deferred major income tax changes until the 1988 session. 
Those states which avoided the windfall did so by a variety 
of mechanisms, including rate reductions, increases in 
personal exemptions or personal credits, and increases in 
standard deductions. Ohio, for example, returned virtually 
all of its windfall by decreasing tax rates, by 7% in 1987 
and 8% in 1988; in addition, it reduced its top bracket to 
offset higher effective rates resulting from base-
21 NCSL's report and table of state actions (NCSL, 54-
58) are the source of much of this information. NASBO's 
Fiscal Survey of the States 1987 and the ACIR report {1988) 
were also useful. Information for two states, Kentucky and 
Michigan, was not available. 
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broadening. 22 Arizona took a different tack, adopting a 
special deduction of 46% of federal tax paid or $475, 
whichever is greater. Two states, Iowa and Massachusetts, 
chose to break with the past by not conforming to the 
federal code. Other states thoroughly overhauled their 
personal income taxes, including Minnesota and New York, 
which reduced the number of tax rates to two, Colorado, 
which adopted a single tax rate, and West Virginia, which 
adopted a new tax with no deductions and a top rate only 
half of its former top rate. 
As this broad picture of state actions on the windfall 
adds perspective, a closer look at the processes also offers 
additional insights. In the Washington D.C. area, it· was 
possible to observe closely the windfall developments in 
three jurisdictions with positive windfall amounts, 
Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., which had a 
windfall of the exact same nature as the states. Virginia's 
income tax revenues were projected to rise by 8%, Maryland's 
by 9%, and the District's by 10%~. Ample scope for 
misperception of these sums was evident from the first. 
Dubbed "windfalls," a misleading term in the first place, 
22There were minor additional provisions for a child 
care credit and a small increase in the property tax circuit 
breaker for the elderly. 
nThis figure assumes that the District continued 
updating as it had in the past. 
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these additional revenues were prominently referred to as a 
"cash bonanza," a "surprise bonus," an "automatic dividend 
for the states," a "boon for state budget makers." 
Maryland's governor-elect, William Donald Schaefer, called 
early on for the use of its additional $166 million in 
revenues to finance educational and social service programs 
to help the poor and the hard-core unemployed. Mayor Marion 
Barry proposed to keep half (originally more) of the 
windfall accruing to the District of Columbia, to meet 
"pressing social needs." Certainly, the possibility of 
illusion on the part of public officials seems to apply 
here. In contrast, Virginia's Governor Gerald L. Baliles 
took a different tack at the earliest stages, advocating the 
full return of the windfall. 
The development of the issue from this initial point 
was interesting to watch in all jurisdictions, particularly 
so in Maryland and the District of Columbia, where the 
situation seemed to fit the classic case of public officials 
fostering illusion in order to expand public expenditures. 
Of the forces limiting the extent of fiscal illusion 
discussed in Chapter Four, many were seen at play. Articles 
in local newspapers exhibited a high degree of awareness of 
the unlegislated tax changes associated with the windfalls. 
Articles citing the studies of the National Conference of 
State Legislatures and of the Advisory Commission on 
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Intergovernmental Relations -- both agencies that owe their 
existence to a perceived and publicly-supported need for 
information on state fiscal matters -- appeared in the 
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. Citizen 
interest groups of a quasi-political nature also brought 
their influence to bear on the disposition of the windfall 
revenues. Columnists clarified the issues, as did 
individuals who wrote letters to the editors of local 
newspapers, stressing that the windfall represented a tax 
increase and calling for its return. Local columnist Judy 
Mann wrote: 
Already we are being treated to the 
spectacle of sticky-fingered politicians 
playing with this pot of gold that's 
suddenly appeared underneath the rainbow 
in state capitols across the country. In 
Maryland, Gov.-elect William Donald 
Schaefer has suggested that the state 
keep the $166 million it expects to find 
in the pot and use it to pay for 
programs to help the poor and the 
unemployed. This all sounds very high-
minded, but if the state's lawmakers had 
to vote a direct tax increase of $166 
million on the citizenry to finance 
these high-minded programs -- or a 9 
percent tax increase on the taxpayers 
they wouldn't be able to get a quorum. 
New York Gov. Mario Cuomo and Ohio 
Gov. Richard F. Celeste have pledged to 
give the money back by lowering the tax 
rates. That's the right thing to do. 
Anything less is clipping the taxpayers. 
In the face of steadfast refusal by Maryland's governor 
to commit himself to returning the windfall, in spite of his 
primary campaign promises not to raise taxes, Maryland 
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legislators developed proposals to return at least a portion 
of the expected windfall, at least for one year. In an 
attempt to deal with the uncertainty of the magnitude of the 
windfalls that resulted particularly from the difficulty in 
estimating behavioral responses to the capital gains 
provisions of the Tax Reform Act, legislators considered 
actions that would be limited to the present year alone, 
until more was known. Various proposals for returning the 
money were explored, including a tax-credit on state income 
tax returns, an increase in the personal exemption that is 
taken by every taxpayer, an increase in the standard 
deduction taken by nonitemizers and a decrease in the 
capital gains tax. Strong sentiment for a return was felt 
among legislative leaders, one of whom said that he could 
defend a gasoline tax increase to his constituents but that 
he did not necessarily believe the same was possible with 
the income tax windfall. 
When the issue came to a vote in Maryland, the 
legislature itself was split, with the House voting to 
return approximately 60% of the windfall (mainly through a 
$10 tax credit, increases in the standard deduction, tax 
breaks for single heads of households, and an earned income 
tax credit for the disadvantaged) but the Senate favoring a 
90% return (that included a 40% capital gains deduction as 
well as increases in the personal exemption and standard 
deduction). Both plans exceeded the governor's final 
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attempt to return only about 28%. By the end of March, 
agreement to return about two thirds of the amount had been 
reached, primarily by increasing the personal exemption and 
standard deduction. In addition, an earned income tax 
credit of 50% of the federal credit was introduced for 
taxpayers with children, and the exclusion of 40% of capital 
gains from taxable income was retained for the computation 
of state income tax in spite of its being discontinued at 
the federal level. (Gold 439-440) 
In all the legislative debate, it would be hard to make 
a case that the voters had been fooled. The debate was well 
reported in the press, and the view that the proceeds from 
federal tax revision represented an unlegislated tax 
increase was given prominence. Said Sen. John A. Cade, as 
reported in the Washington Post, 
I believe we should either give back or 
not take all • • • of the benefit from 
the federal tax changes. If programs 
require a tax increase, [the state] 
should face up to it and vote it up or 
down and not take money from a back-door 
source. 
The fact that the issue did become publicized and did 
receive explicit attention in so many states can be seen as 
one manifestation of the strength of the forces that limit 
the impact of illusion when the potential damage of its 
distortions is great. There is a "catch-22" in the attempt 
to assess the impact of illusion. Chapter Two argues that 
much illusion is irrelevant to the political outcome and 
II 
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that eliminating it would be wasteful. Such illusion can be 
expected to persist without distorting the political 
outcome. It is further arqued in Chapter Four that 
significant forces do work to dispel illusion when its 
impact is potentially damaging to an important extent. 
Since these forces involve dispelling illusion in the group 
of voters that is likely to affect the outcome, the case can 
then be made that since the circumstances were well known to 
the public, no illusion existed. In this case it may be 
arqued that the windfalls are not an "illusion variable" 
after all because the windfalls did receive a significant 
degree of publicity. It is my contention that this 
publicity is endogenous, that the potential for illusion did 
exist in the case of the windfalls, as was evident in the 
early reactions to it, and that its strong potential for the 
distortion of public choices to the significant detriment of 
the electorate elicited the publicity it received. 
In the District of Columbia, Marion Barry spelled out 
his proposal for keeping half of the $295 million expected 
over the five years beq~nning in 1987, in a plan that would 
mean from 1% to 21.9% more in 1987 city income taxes for 
about one fourth of city taxpayers who earn $35,000 or more. 
Though the mayor's presentation of his plan emphasized the 
tax breaks many residents would receive, omitting the 
examples that showed the heavy burden upon middle-income 
families as well as the burden upon upper-income residents, 
L 
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columnist Dorothy Gilliam called for details, stating that, 
"The main problem is that Barry has not made the case 
sufficiently for the pressing social programs that would 
justify his proposal for the windfall," while a Washington 
Post editorial concluded, "· •• the mayor's proposal is not 
a 'keeper• -- it's an official legislative request to the 
council for a tax increase." In an opjed piece, D.C. 
Council member John A Wilson criticized the plan for falling 
too heavily on middle-income residents, saying, "I am not 
going to support any kind of tax increase in 1987." In a 
classic Tiebout argument he further cited the District's 
difficulty in attracting residents with incomes of $20,000 
or over, emphasizing the effect on revenues of the exodus of 
middle-class taxpayers that could be expected from an even 
higher tax differential with the suburbs: "It is 
shortsighted to say that we will use that 'windfall' to 
finance programs if by so doing we drive out the very 
citizens who provide that financing through the taxes they 
pay each year." Citizens' groups urged the city to forgo 
what he called a 11backdoor11 increase. 
In the end Virginia passed a "windfall rebate law," 
much like that originally proposed by Governor Baliles. It 
increased the personal exemption and standard deduction and 
made some rate reductions, to return $144 million of the 
expected FY 1987 windfall. The $29 million it retained, it 
did so explicitly to provide a reserve against errors in the 
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windfall estimates, unanticipated reductions in federal aid, 
or a worsening economic climate. 
In an interesting coda, in the fall of 1987 Virginia 
legislators pressed for further action in the face of an 
announced $138 million surplus for FY 1986, and a projected 
additional $16 million surplus for FY 1987, "sounding the 
alarm" that a predicted $300 million-a-year windfall, 
largely from middle-class residents, would materialize if 
the current tax structure were maintained. Though the 
governor cautioned against either spending or returning it, 
the Lieutenant Governor, L. Douglas Wilder, urged that, 
"None of the so-called windfall should be kept by state 
government to spend." 
VIII. summary and Conclusions 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 created the tax "windfalls" 
automatic changes in state government revenues that were 
an unintended byproduct of national legislative action, 
independent of the states' decisions concerning their levels 
of expenditures and revenues. The literature of fiscal 
illusion suggests that because citizens do not clearly 
perceive important fiscal variables, public officials will 
be able to adapt such "automatic" revenue changes and other 
fiscal instruments to advance their own ends at the expense 
of the public interest. The existing attempts to provide 
empirical support for the existence and importance of fiscal 
& 
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illusion as a source of bias in the allocation of resources 
within and to the government sector have been seriously 
compromised by the endogeneity of the illusion variables. 
The windfalls provide a unique opportunity to test the 
hypotheses of fiscal illusion for the case of an exogenous 
illusion variable. 
This chapter presents estimates of the dollar 
magnitudes of the windfalls and, within the well-established 
theoretical and econometric approach to the specification of 
the demand for public goods, tests the hypothesis that the 
windfalls have exerted a significant influence upon the 
level of state government expenditures. The central finding 
is that the estimated coefficient of the windfall variable 
is not significant, a result that is consistent with the 
absence of any systematic effect of the tax windfalls upon 
the level of state government expenditures. This empirical 
finding is consistent with the theoretical support for the 
proposition that there are significant limitations upon the 
ability of fiscal illusion to exert a significant impact 














National Conference of State Legislatures, 
State Budget Actions in 1987 (Denver: 
NCSL, 1987), p. 72 
u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 
April, 1987, p. 34 
Estimated from 
u.s. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
mental Relations, "Preliminary Estimates of 
the Effect of the 1986 Federal Tax Reform Act 
on state Pe+sonal Income Tax Liabilities" 
(Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1987), pp. 17-18 
and u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, State Government Tax Collections 
in 1986, p. 3 
u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
census, state Government Finances in 1986, 
p. 6 
u. s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the u .. s. 
{1987), p. 284 
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
census, Statistical Abstract of the U. s. 
(1987) 1 P• 259 
u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, "Press Release," December 31, 1986 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the u.s. 
(1987), p. 27 
1Except as noted, all sources are Government Printing 
Office publications, Washington, D.C. 
143 
D u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
{1987}, p. 21 
144 
Data for the outside exogenous variables used in the 
first stage were obtained from the 1986 State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book and from the 1986 and 1987 
editions of the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
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